The South West Africa Cases by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1967 Issue 2 
January 1967 
The South West Africa Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The South West Africa Cases, 1967 WASH. U. L. Q. 159 (1967). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss2/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES
On November 4, 1960, the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia' insti-
tuted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against the South
African government3 alleging inter alia that South Africa's apartheid policy'
violated certain articles of the League of Nations Mandate for South West
Africa and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League. In its judgment of
December 21, 1962, the Court dismissed the jurisdictional objections and
found that it was competent to hear the case on the merits. However, after
hearing arguments, the Court on July 18, 1966, surprisingly dismissed the
case on the grounds that the Applicants lacked standing to raise the issues
because they possessed no legal right or interest in the subject matter of their
claims. This note is an analysis of the major issues raised by this litigation.
To introduce the analysis, the first section of the note briefly reviews the
history of the South West African Mandate prior to the initiation of the
suit. The preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court raised by
South Africa are discussed in the second section. The reasons for the dis-
missal are examined in detail in the third section. The last section is con-
cerned with the two substantive issues, dealt with as dicta in the 1966 de-
cision, raised by the litigation: whether South Africa's apartheid policy
violates "standards" of conduct for mandated nations; and to what extent
may the Court rely upon any international "norm" which can be inter-
preted as prohibiting all governments from discriminating against its sub-
jects on the basis of race or group membership.
I. HISTORY OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA
A. Under the League of Nations
The geographic area known as South West Africa was originally colonized
by Germany in the late nineteenth century. During and after World War
I, the Union of South Africa sought to gain exclusive control over the Ger-
man colony. During the war, some of the Allied governments secretly
agreed that claims to occupied German territory would be recognized in
the event of an Allied victory.' Though indorsed by the British War Cabi-
1. Hereinafter referred to as Applicants.
2. Hereinafter also referred to as the Court.
3. Hereinafter also referred to as Respondent.
4. South West Africa, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. 487-89 (Mbanefo, dissenting
opinion) (hereinafter cited as S.W.A. CAsEs II). The alleged apartheid policy is re-
produced in the Appendix.
5. South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. 319, 592 (Van Wyk, dissenting opinion)
(hereinafter cited as S.W.A. CAsEs I). For an extended history of the development of
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net, these agreements did not long endure under strong American opposi-
tion to such annexation proposals. In their stead, President Wilson pro-
posed that the Covenant of the League of Nations should provide for
complete authority and control of these territories by principal Allied and
Associated Powers under Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles." To imple-
ment this concept, the League was to be given authority to delegate its ad-
ministrative power to a nation-state which was to act "'as its agent or man-
datory.' "' This proposal ultimately became Article 22 of the Covenant of
the League, which provided for a permanent mandates system under which
former enemy territory was to be entrusted to certain individual nations
which acted as mandatories and were accountable directly to the League.'
The Mandate of South West Africa was conferred upon "His Britannic
Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of
South Africa." South Africa was responsible directly to the League for
South West Africa see C. DUNDAS, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (1964); H. VEDDER, SOUTi
WEST AFuCA IN EARLY TIMES (1938).
6. Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles (1918): "Germany renounces in favour of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea
possessions." III TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 3336,
3342-43 (1923).
7. S.W.A. CASES I 592 (Van Wyk, dissenting opinion).
8. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22 (hereinafter cited as COVENANT).
Article 22 of the Covenant provided for the formation of three groups of mandates
based upon the stage of development of the people, the geographic situation of its terri-
tory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances. The "A" group was com-
prised of the former Turkish colonies of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine,
whose existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognized, subject to
advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they were able to stand alone.
The 'B" group was comprised of Germany's former Central Africa colonies, which were
considered to be at such a stage that the mandatory "was to be responsible for the ad-
ministration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience
and religion. . . ." The "C" mandate included such territories as South West Africa and
certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to their sparseness of population and
economic underdevelopment, were to be "administered under the laws of the Mandatory
as integral portions of its territory."
The basic treaty provisions relating to the League's mandates system are contained in
Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, III TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC.,
supra note 6, at 3390-91; in Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at
Lausanne on July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11, 23; and in the various mandate agreements
concluded between the council of the League and the respective states which acted as
mandatories, MANDATE AGREEMENT FOR GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA, U.N. Dec.
A/70 (1946) (hereinafter cited as MANDATE).
For a concise exposition of the legal situation resulting from the provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles, see International Status of South West Africa I.C.J.-Pleadings
188-89 (1950).
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proper administration of the mandated territory.' Under this Mandate, the
Union was to have full power of administration over the territory and was
to apply its own laws and legislation in the exercise of the Mandate. These
broad powers, however, were restricted:
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legisla-
tion over the Territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral
portion of the Union of South Africa; and may apply the laws of the
Union of South Africa to the Territory, subject to such local modifica-
tions as circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory
subject to the present Mandate."
The Mandate further provided that any dispute between the Mandatory
and another member of the League relating to the interpretation or applica-
9. See MANDATE.
In its advisory opinion of July 11, 1950, the International Court of Justice observed
that the mandates system created by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League was a
"new international institution." International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J.
128, 132 (hereinafter cited as S.W.A. STATUS). See also J. BRMRLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 181-89 (6th ed. 1963); H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 566
(1950); 1 L. OPPENHE1M, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 94c (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
10. MANDATE, art. 2. Articles 3 and 4 further prohibit the slave trade, forced labor,
trafficking of arms and alcohol, military training of the natives, and the erection of mili-
tary bases within the territory. Article 5 requires the Mandatory to ensure freedom of
conscience and free exercise of all forms of worship, and to permit the unrestricted travel
of missionaries within the territory.
It was apparently foreseen by the League that the laws of the mandatory would not
always be suitable for application to the mandated territory and that the mandatory
would not take the trouble to change such laws. See E. VAN MAANEN-HELMER, THE
MANDATES SYSTEM IN RELATION TO AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 208 (1929).
A Permanent Mandate Commission was established to rectify such a problem by
close supervision, thus obviating the possibility of a mandatory rendering nugatory the
ultimate objectives of the mandates system by application of laws and legislation to
the territory which tend to impede the development of a self-sufficient populace.
Contra, W. KENNEDY & H. SCHLOSBERG, THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTrTUTION 516 (1935):
The Union of South Africa determines by what laws South-West Africa is to be
governed and how these laws are to be enforced. Once having elected to hand over
South-West Africa to the Union, the League of Nations has no power to dictate
how that territory is to be governed. The fact that the mandatory is required to
report to the League what its political actions are in the mandated territory, makes
no difference. It is a treaty obligation, which does not negative the Union's
rights and powers. The full power of legislation and administration over the
territory is therefore vested in the Union of South Africa and there is no other
which can enforce law there. Even the United Kingdom stands in the same
relation to the Union in this matter as any other power ... The Union, therefore,
has sovereign power over the territory, and it has power to make laws and enforce
them over the whole sphere of government. (emphasis added).
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tion of the provisions of the Mandate was to be submitted to the Permanent
Court of International Justice if negotiation proved ineffective."1
Under this explicit authorization the government of the Union enacted
the Administration of Justice Proclamation in 1919, whereby the Roman-
Dutch Law as existing and applied in the province of the Cape of Good
Hope on January 1, 1920, was introduced as the common law of the terri-
tory, replacing the German Law. 2 For five years the Parliament of the
Union legislated directly for the Territory. Then, in 1925, the Union Parlia-
ment passed the Constitutional Act providing for the election of a South
West African assembly of limited legislative powers containing twelve
elected and six nominated members. Since the electors were exclusively of
European origin, the natives were effectively precluded from exercising any
voice in territorial legislation.' s
During the initial stages of the administration of the mandated territory
of South West Africa, the courts of the Union of South Africa handed down
two decisions which reflected the Union's conception of the status of the
territory.
The case of Rex v. Chistian4 arose in 1923. The defendant, a resident
of South West Africa, had been convicted by the courts of South West
Africa on the charge of treason"s against the Union for his alleged partici-
pation in the Bondelzwarte Rebellion of 1922. Defendant urged that, since
the sovereignty over the territory did not lie either in the local administrator
or in the government of the Union of South Africa, the elements of the
offense of treason could not be constituted. The court rejected the plea and
unanimously held that the Mandatory possessed sufficient elements of both
internal and external sovereignty to sustain the obligation of allegiance by
the inhabitants of the territory.
In the second case,'" decided three years later, the court was faced
11. MANDATE, art. 7. The significance of this provision will become apparent when
considered in conjunction with the compulsory jurisdiction clause, Article 37, of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. See note 79 infra.
12. W. KENNEDY & H. SCHLOSBERG, supra note 10, at 527-28. Commenting on the
effect of this proclamation the authors state:
The effect of this proclamation was that Roman-Dutch Law has been introduced
into South-West Africa together with all the modifications which it had undergone
in the Cape Province by desuetude, custom, judicial decision, and statute, whether
abrogating or enacting.
13. However, a number of important matters, including native affairs, for which
the Mandatory has special responsibility, were reserved for an Executive Council, in
which the Administrator is assisted by four members elected from the Assembly. N.
BENTWicr, THE MANDATES SYsTM 99-100 (1930).
14. [1924] S. Afr. L.R. 101 (1923) (A.D.).
15. The crime is known as Majestas in Roman-Dutch Law.
16. Cape Law Soc'y v. Van Aardt, [1926] S. Afr. L.R. 312 (C.P. Div).
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with the question of whether or not a criminal judgment rendered in the
courts of the Territory was to be treated as a foreign judgment by the courts
of the Union. The Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, ruled that
the court which gave the judgment could not be regarded as a foreign tri-
bunal since the Mandatory was authorized to administer the land as an
"integral portion" of its own territory."
17. Id. at 317. Some text-writers have concluded that sovereignty over a mandated
territory rests in the mandatory. W. KENNEDY & H. SCHLOSBERG, supra note 10, at
511. A variation of this conclusion has been accepted by a few national courts of other
mandatories. Cf. Chow Hung Ching v. The King, 77 Commw. L.R. 449 (Austl. 1948);
Nelson v. Braisby, [1934] N.Z.U.N. 228 (1933); 36 N.Z. GAz. L.R. 227 (1934). The
publicits are not in complete agreement as to the exact location of sovereignty. See
E. VAN MAANEN-HELMER, supra note 10, at 45-47. The author therein summarily
states the various viewpoints:
A few have held that the sovereignty over the mandated territories lies with the
mandatory Powers, and they have inferred, logically enough, that, since this is the
case, the mandates system is really equivalent to annexation, and that is only owing
to the good will of the mandatory Powers that the League is allowed to supervise
their administration. Most writers believe, on the contrary, that sovereignty resides
with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with the League, or, in a residual
way, with the inhabitants of the mandated territories....
The real truth lies outside both these sets of arguments. The truth is that there
is no such thing as sovereignty over the mandated territories, because there is
nothing even resembling absolute power .... The power of the League is limited
by the fact that since the League is not an administrative body, it can only super-
vise what the mandatory Powers do, but can do nothing itself. Finally, the power
of the Mandatories is limited, first by their obligations as signatories of Article 22,
and secondly by the right of supervision of the League.
See also Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System,
42 Am. J. INT'L L. 263, 271 (1948).
The International Court considers sovereignty over a mandated territory to be in
abeyance:
. . . [I]f and when the inhabitants of the Territory obtain recognition as an inde-
pendent State, as has already happened in the case of some of the Mandates,
sovereignty will revive and vest in the new State. S.W.A. STATUS 150 (McNair,
separate opinion).
Similarly, it has been established that the native population of the mandated territory
does not acquire the nationality of the respective mandatory powers as a result of the
transfer of the territory to the Mandatory under the mandate system. See 3 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFF. J. 604 (1923); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 210-11 (4th ed.
A. McNair 1928). However, the exact nationality of the populace has continued to
be a matter of much speculation. See O'Connell, Nationality in 'C' Class Mandates,
31 BaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 458 (1954).
Thus, it would appear that the mandatories were not given unrestricted control over
the mandated territory, but were to remain solely and absolutely responsible for the
administration of the mandate to the League, which was vested with the unqualified
right of supervision. E. VAN MAANEN-HELMER, supra note 10, at 42; see A. MAROALITH,
THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATES 69-70 (1930), where the author expresses the view
that the mandatory is under a duty to delegate the administration of the territory to
a territorial government:
Although it is the mandatory government which is held responsible for the execu-
tion of the mandate, it cannot, itself, in the nature of things, govern the mandated
territory. The administration of the territory must be delegated to the territorial
government which, though subordinate, must work on the general lines laid down
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B. After Dissolution of the League
With the dismembering of the League following World War II, a ques-
tion arose as to the fate of the mandated territories, and whether the newly
created United Nations succeeded to the right of the League to force com-
pliance with the mandates."8 Although the Charter of the United Nations
did not explicitly provide for the continuation of the mandates, it estab-
lished an international trusteeship system for the administration and super-
vision of nonself-governing underdeveloped territories, including those then
under mandate.19
In a final resolution upon formal dissolution of the League, the Assembly
expressed the intention that those members then administering territories
under mandate should continue to do so.2" Eventually, all of the former
mandated territories were either granted independence or were placed under
the trusteeship system, with the sole exception of South West Africa.2 1
The question of South West Africa was brought before the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1946, after the Legislative Assembly of South
West Africa adopted a resolution requesting the administrator of the terri-
tory to seek formal annexation by the government of the Union of South
Africa.22 By memorandum," the delegation of South Africa requested the
General Assembly to accede to the proposed resolution of annexation.2" The
General Assembly, however, rejected South Africa's proposal and recom-
mended that the Mandated Territory be placed under the trusteeship sys-
by the mandatory government, yet must have wide discretionary powers. This
fact, the partial independence of the territories from the mandatory government,
may work unfortunately for the mandated territory, for, as is often the case, a
government that would give a liberal interpretation to the terms of the mandate
may be represented by officials, mostly drawn from its colonial service, who are
apt to interpret them too strictly.
18. One of the primary differences between the League of Nations and the United
Nations is that the General Assembly has no unanimity requirement in voting as did
the Council of the League, COVENANT art. 5, para. 1. This is significant since no
serious censure of a member is likely to ensue from an organization in which any action
must be by unanimous consent. Landis, South West Africa in the International Court:
Act II, Scene 1, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 179, 186 (1964).
19. Articles 75-91 provide for the creation and administration of the trusteeship
system. U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91.
20. R. CHOWDHUEI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS 113
(1955).
21. See Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System,
42 Am.J.. INT'L L. 263 (1948).
22. 1 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm., Annexes 13, at 199, U.N. Doc. A/123 (1946).
23. Id. at 232.
24. Id. at 199-235.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss2/3
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES
tem.25 The government of the Union was invited to submit a trusteeship
agreement, " but its representative to the General Assembly replied that "the
Union Government reserves its position as the administering authority, and
in the meantime will continue to administer the territory in the spirit of the
Mandate. '
27
In 1949, following the Nationalist Party victory, South Africa expanded
its Parliament to include South West African representatives elected by
Europeans only. 25 That same year the submission of annual reports, as pro-
vided for in the Mandate,29 was unilaterally curtailed by the Union."0 Thus,
the Union had, in effect, ceased functioning as a mandatory.
Reacting to the avowed intent of the Union to administer the Territory
in a manner directly contrary to the policy adopted by the Trusteeship
Council of the General Assembly", and to the Union's general disregard for
any cooperative resolution of the matter, the United Nations, as successor
to the League,12 invoked the jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice, in its advisory capacity, in order to determine the legal status of South
West Africa.
In July of 1950, the Court held that South Africa was under an obliga-
tion to accept its compulsory jurisdiction in a dispute relating to the inter-
pretation or application of the provisions of the Mandate3 The opinion
affirmed South West Africa's status as a territory under international man-
date and the concomitant obligations on the part of the Union." The pro-
25. 1 U.N. GAOR 123 (1946).
26. Id.
27. E. HELLMAN, HANDBOOK ON RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH Aroc& 757 (1949).
28. South West Africa before the United Nations, 16 WORLD TODAY 334, 339 (1960).
29. MANDATE, art. 6.
30. 4 U.N. GAOR 102-03 (1949).
In a later statement the Union Government, through its General Assembly Repre-
sentative, declared that previous submissions of the annual reports were not indicative of
its accountability to the United Nations for administration of the Territory. 4 U.N.
GAOR, 4th Comm., at 199, 202, A/929, A/933, A/962 (1949).
31. The Official Report of the General Assembly stated: "The South African Gov-
ernment was firmly convinced that the policy of encouraging the separate development
of the indigenous population in its own environment was to the advantage of the popu-
lation." 4 U.N. GAOR, supra note 30, at 202. Such a position is hardly consistent
with the statement by the Trusteeship Council that "great efforts should be made to
eliminate, through education and other positive measures, whatever reasons may exist
that explain segregation." 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 4, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/603 (1948).
For specific examples of apartheid regulations, see S.W.A. CASES II 486-89 (Mbanefo,
separate opinion) reproduced in the Appendix.
32. S.W.A. CASES II 92, 214 (Van Wyk, separate opinion), 270, 274 (Tanaka,
dissenting opinion), 463 (Padilla Nervo, dissenting opinion).
33. S.W.A. STATUS 138.
34. Id. at 143. The obligations of the Union included transmitting petitions from
the inhabitants of the territory to the United Nations, which the Court viewed as having
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visions of the U. N. Charter relating to trusteeship were held applicable to
South West Africa only insofar as they provided a means by which the Ter-
ritory might be brought under the trusteeship system." The Court declined
to impose on the Union a legal obligation to place the Territory under the
trusteeship system"6 but did hold that the Union was not competent to mod-
ify unilaterally the international status of South West Africa."7
The Union's first response to the Court's opinion was to regard it as
merely advisory and therefore of no binding effect." However, South Africa
subsequently took a less determined stand, stating that it was prepared to
engage in talks on the basis that there was no question of a trusteeship agree-
ment."9
The United Nations General Assembly accepted the advisory opinion
and established an ad hoc committee for the purpose of seeking an effective
solution to the problem."0 The committee was authorized to negotiate with
the Union as far as possible within the procedure of the former mandate
system."' However, its accomplishments were rendered nugatory because
of the lack of cooperation on the part of South Africa.42
After another advisory opinion by the Court concerning the voting pro-
cedure in the General Assembly on matters pertaining to South West
Africa, 3 the Union transferred the administration of the "Native" affairs
the supervisory functions formerly exercised by the League. Judges McNair and Neid
dissented on this question, holding that the apparatus of international supervision estab-
lished by the League had lapsed by its dissolution. However, both argued that this
fact did not bring the Mandate to an end, even if it weakened it, since Article 7 of
the Mandate had been preserved in Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (hereinafter cited as I.C.J. STAT.). Thus, the legal rights and interests of
those members of the League who were parties to the Statute of the International Court
were preserved, and these rights included the right to bring the Union before the Court
under its compulsory jurisdiction. Id. at 138.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ballinger, The International Court of Justice and the South West Africa Cases,
81 S. AFR. L.J. 35, 38 (1964). This is a legally defensible position since the opinion
was merely advisory and did not place the Government of the Union of South Africa
under a duty of observance.
39. INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW
87 (1960).
40. G.A. Res. 449-A(2), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 20, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
41. Id.
42. 2 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3626 (1957).
43. Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Report and Petition Concerning the
Territory of South West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67, 78. The Court was of the opinion
that a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly was required to initiate action
with regards to matters pertaining to South West Africa.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss2/3
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES
of the Territory to the Union Minister of Native Affairs," further integrat-
ing the Territory into South Africa. 5
In 1957, the report of the Committee on South West Africa 6 indicated
that the trend in "Native" administration was in the direction of the im-
position of a more severe application of apartheid than had already existed."
The report prompted the appointment of a goodwill mission,4 which even-
tually recommended partition of the Mandate Territory," and led to a
study by the standing committee on South West Africa of possible legal
action by which to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations of the Man-
date."0 In its conclusion, the committee drew attention to the legal action
open to member states under Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 37 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice: reference of
any dispute concerning the interpretation of the Mandate to the Court for
its adjudication.5 ' The General Assembly, thereafter invited eligible mem-
ber nations to initiate proceedings against the Union if South Africa per-
sisted in its refusal to cooperate with United Nations committees. 2
II. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS"
Late in 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia filed applications with the Inter-
national Court of Justice based on the premise that the Court had suc-
ceeded to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International justice
by virtue of Article 37 of the Court's charter.54 Further reliance was placed
44. 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, at 10, U.N. Doe. A/3151 (1956).
45. Id. at 11.
46. 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, at 4, U.N. Doc A/3626 (1957).
47. Id. at 9.
48. G.A. Res. 1143(X), 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
49. 13 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 39, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/3900 (1958).
50. G.A. Res. 1060(XI), 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 17, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/3572
(1957).
51. 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12(A), at 6, U.N. Doc. A/3625 (1957).
52. G.A. Res. 1360(XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 28-29, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1959).
53. For an extended discussion of the "preliminary objections" raised by the Union
of South Africa and the subsequent disposition thereof by the International Court, see
Ballinger, supra note 38; Feder, Rice & Etra, The South-West Africa Cases: A Sym-
posium, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1965); Landis, supra note 18.
54. S.W.A. CASES I 321. I.C.J. STAT. art. 37 provides:
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to
a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the
present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice.
See also U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 1, which states that "all Members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice."
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on the compulsory jurisdiction clause of Article 7 of the Mandate for South
West Africa which provided that any unresolved disputes with any League
member concerning the Mandate should be submitted to the Permanent
Court for resolution."s Since Ethiopia and Liberia satisfied the criterion of
the Permanent Court that "only states... can be parties in cases before the
[Permanent] Court,"5 both during the existence of the League"7 and at
the time of the commencement of the proceedings, 8 their applications were
accepted.59
In substance, the applications requested the Court to reaffirm its position
of 1950 that South West Africa is a territory under a mandate exercised by
the Union; that the Mandate is a treaty in force; that the Union remains
subject to the international obligations of Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League and the Mandate; that the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions is the legally qualified organization to exercise the supervisory functions
previously exercised by the League regarding the territorial administration;
and that the Union must necessarily submit to the supervision and control
of the General Assembly regarding the exercise of the Mandate, the trans-
mission of petitions from the populace to the United Nations, and the sub-
mission of an annual report on territorial administration as provided for in
Article 6 of the Mandate.60 The applications alleged that the Union has
55. Art. 7(2) provides as follows:
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the
Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the inter-
pretation or application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it
cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
This provision has been regarded as recognition by each of the mandatory powers
of the Permanent Court of International Justice as the final authority in disputes over
interpretation of the mandates. See N. BENTWIICH, supra note 13, at 120; Q. WuouT,
MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 91, 155 (1930).
56. Article 34 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See
STAT. P.C.I.j., in -IUDSON, PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 669, 676
(1943).
57. Both Ethiopia and Liberia were members of the League and therefore fulfill
the criterion of Article 34, since the Covenant provided that only "fully self-governing"
states could be members. COVENANT art. 1, para. 2.
58. Both Ethiopia and Liberia are members of the United Nations, the Charter
of which provides for membership only by "states." U.N. CHARTER arts. 3 & 4.
59. Landis, supra note 18, at 193, points out that in her conversation with African
representatives at the United Nations the question arose as to whether other African
nations, former colonies of Britain and France, had succeeded to the status of the mother
country and thereby became competent to initiate these proceedings. However, such
question was not presented to the Court by inclusion of other African states as applicants
because of the possibility of distracting the Court's attention from the substantive issues
involved.
60. S.W.A. CASES I 322-33.
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substantially modified the terms of the Mandate without the consent of the
United Nations, thereby violating Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 22
of the Covenant of the League; that the Union has not promoted to the ut-
most the material and moral well-being and social progress of the peoples of
the Territory; and that the Union has practiced apartheid by adoption and
application of legislation, administrative regulations, and official actions
which suppress the rights and liberties of peoples of the territory. All of
these actions were alleged to be inconsistent with the international status of
the Territory."1
South Africa's reply to these allegations was that "the Governments of
Ethiopia and Liberia have no locus standi in these contentious proceedings
and that the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to hear, or adjudicate
upon, the questions of law and fact raised." 2 Thus, the Union's prelimi-
nary objections sought to defeat the jurisdiction of the Court rather than
to defend on the merits of the case:
Firstly, ... the Mandate for South West Africa is no longer a "treaty
or convention in force" within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute
of the Court, this Submission being advanced (a) with respect to the
said Mandate Agreement as a whole, including Article 7 thereof, and
(b) in any event, with respect to Article 7 itself;
Secondly, neither the Government of Ethiopia nor the Government
of Liberia is "another Member of the League of Nations," as required
for locus standi by Article 7 of the Mandate for South West Africa;
Thirdly, the conflict or disagreement alleged by the Governments of
Ethiopia and Liberia to exist between them and the Government of
the Republic of South Africa, is by reason of its nature and content
not a "dispute" as envisaged in Article 7 of the Mandate for South
West Africa, more particularly in that no material interests of the Gov-
ernments of Ethiopia and/or Liberia or of their nationals are involved
therein or affected thereby;
Fourthly, the alleged conflict or disagreement is as regards its state
of development not a "dispute" which "cannot be settled by negotia-
tion" within the meaning of Article 7 of the Mandate for South West
Africa. 3
The Court handed down a judgment on December 21, 1962, rejecting
all four of the Union's objections by a majority of eight to seven." The
majority opinion first considered whether the parties had previously con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is a fundamental principle of
international law that a sovereign is under no legal compulsion to submit
61. Id. at 323-24.
62. Id. at 326.
63. Id. at 326-27.
64. Id. at 319.
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its disputes to any tribunal, except as it has consented to do so.e" Consent
may be manifested in a variety of ways, one of which is entering into treaties
conferring automatic jurisdiction upon the International Court of Justice,
or some other tribunal, over certain judicial disputes. 6 The Mandate agree-
ment contained such a compulsory jurisdiction clause." Thus, for the Court
to establish its jurisdiction over the controversy, it had to find that "the
Mandate, in fact and in law, is an international agreement having the
character of a treaty or convention."8 " The Court was not to be deterred
by mere misnomerse asserting that neither terminology nor lack of form"0
was a determinative factor as to the character of an international agree-
ment.
65. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 63 (2d ed. 1962). This was the argument
advanced by Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice in their dissenting opinions. S.W.A. CASES
I 467, 473-74, 501-02, 545 (Spencer and Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion). See also,
J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS, 368 (6th ed. 1963); 6 G. HACKwORTH, DioEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-147 (1943); 2 L. OPPENHIMM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1-96 (6th
ed. H. Lauterpacht 1940).
66. See Bishop and Myers, Unwarranted Extension of Connally-Amendment Thinking,
55 Am. J. INT'L L. 135 (1961).
67. MANDATE, art. 7(2).
68. S.W.A. CASES I 330. The Court noted that it had no jurisdiction under
Article 36(l) of the Statute, which provides for jurisdiction over all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 1.
69. S.W.A. CASES I 331. The Mandate is described in its last paragraph as a
"Declaration."
Note that the International Law Commission has formulated the following definition
for purposes of its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, a definition adopted by Judges
Spender and Fitzmaurice in their joint dissent (S.W.A. CASES I 475):
"Treaty" means any international agreement in written form, whether em-
bodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
its particular designation. . . concluded between two or more States or other
subjects of international law and governed by international law. 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
Coum'N 161, U.N. Doc. A/CN, 4/SER. A/1962/Add.1.
The Union of South Africa's contention in this regard was that in defining the terms
of the Mandate, the Council was taking executive action in pursuance of the Covenant,
,and was not entering into an agreement which could be considered a treaty or con-
vention. S.W.A. CASES I 330.
70. The Mandate instrument, which recorded both prior written agreements and
oral negotiations, was unratified and unsigned.
The Court held that the Mandate need not be registered under Article 18 of the
Covenant of the League because the Covenant only became effective January 10, 1920,
while the Mandate had actually been conferred seven months earlier. Id. at 332.
The Court's position as to the lack of form has found authoritative support from
both publicists and precedent. See Customs Regime between Austria and Germany,
[1931] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 41, at 47; H. LAUTERPACHT, FIRST REPORT ON THE
LAw oF TREATIES (1953); A. McNAmR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1961); 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 481-82, at 868 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955);
1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 430 (3d ed. 1957).
71. S.W.A. CASES I 331, 405 (Jessup, separate opinion). The court placed con-
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Of course, the Mandate could be considered a treaty only if the Union
of South Africa and the League of Nations both had treaty-making ca-
pacity."2 South Africa's capacity was indisputable because the Union Gov-
ernment was admitted to the League and was also a signatory to the Treaty
of Versailles. Both of these facts indicate recognition of the Union's treaty-
making capacity by the international community. The League, however,
would appear to present a more difficult question; but, the Court assumed
the existence of such capacity as an incident to the League's international
personality. 3
The Court next considered the argument that the Mandate and its con-
comitant obligations had lapsed upon dissolution of the League." South
Africa contended that the rights and duties concerning the administration
of the territory of South West Africa still existed, while those rights and
obligations relating to supervision by the League and to submission of dis-
putes to the Permanent Court of International Justice, being of a contractual
nature, necessarily became extinct upon dissolution of the League. 5 The
Union also argued that there was no provision in the Charter of the United
Nations for continuing Article 7 of the Mandate."6 However, the majority
found such contentions to be wholly unacceptable in light of the 1950
advisory opinion7 and was adamant in holding that all original duties and
obligations of the Mandate continued in force regardless of the dissolution
siderable emphasis on the fact that the Mandate embodied a provision that it was to be
deposited in the archives of the League and certified copies were to be forwarded to all
signatories of the Versailles Treaty in arriving at the conclusion that the Mandate con-
stituted a "treaty." Id. at 331-32.
72. Id.
73. S.W.A. CASES I 332. This position finds support in an earlier case wherein the
Court declared that the United Nations had an international personality which must
be recognized even by non-member states. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries,
[1949] I.C.J. 174. But, as pointed out by one author, in this opinion there was no
definition of "international personality":
Therefore, an attempt to define "international personality" must cautiously
state the holding of the case on that point, namely that the international personality
may include the right to bring international claims. Feder, The Developing Con-
cept of Treaty, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 56 (1965).
The author also cites the South West Africa cases as standing for the proposition that
international personality may include the right to engage in treaty-making. Id.
74. S.W.A. CASES I 332-33.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 334. In its 1950 advisory opinion the Court had tersely stated:
The authority which the Union Government exercises over the Territory is
based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government con-
tends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights
derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder would not bejustified. S.W.A. STATUS 127, 133.
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of the League."8 Although the League and the Permanent Court both had
ceased to exist, the obligation of the Respondent to submit to the compulsory
jurisdiction of that court was effectively transferred to the International
Court before the dissolution of the League."
The remaining objections were centered mainly upon the terms "another
Member of the League of Nations" and "dispute" as used in Article 7 of
khe Mandate." The Union argued that inasmuch as all the members of
the League necessarily lost their membership and accompanying incidents of
membership when the League was dissolved "there could no longer be
'another member of the League' today.""' Therefore, even if Article 7 of
the Mandate were still in force as a treaty or convention within the mean-
ing of Article 37 of the Statute, no state has locus standi to invoke the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 2 The majority rejected
South Africa's literal interpretation of the phrase "another Member of the
League" as "incompatible with the spirit, purpose, and context of the in-
strument." 3 Because the Council of the League under the unanimity
rules" could not impose its own view upon the Mandatory and could not
appear before the Court as a petitioner, the only possibility for enforce-
ment of the "sacred trust" would be for a member of the League to bring
the dispute before the Permanent Court for its adjudication."'
In April, 1946, all members of the League agreed by resolution to con-
tinue the mandates as far as practically feasible and to maintain the rights
78. judge Jessup was of the opinion that the nature of Article 7 was that of a
"Third-State Beneficiary" contract. S.W.A. CASES I 409 (Jessup, separate opinion).
79. Id. at 334-35. This result was reached by considering Articles 92, 93(1) and
110(4) of the Charter of the United Nations in conjunction with Article 37 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Court, relying on historical and
empirical data, found that South Africa had ratified the provisions of the Charter in
1945 when the League and the Permanent Court were still in existence and when
Article 7 of the Mandate was still in force. Such ratification was, in effect, voluntary
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court in lieu of the
Permanent Court to which it had originally agreed to submit by virtue of Article 7 of
the Mandate.
80. See note 55 supra.
81. S.W.A. CASES I 335.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 336. Undoubtedly, the Court must have been persuaded to some extent
by the Applicants' argument that to find that they did not have the required locus standi
would necessitate overruling of the 1950 advisory opinion. S.W.A. CASES, PLEADNOS,
ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS [1962] I.C.J. 199. The Court, in its 1950 advisory
opinion had unanimously agreed that judicial supervision under Article 7 of the Mandate
had survived the League's demise. S.W.A. STATUS 128, 138. See also, 1 L. OPP.NHEm,
supra note 70, at 226 n.3 for a commentary on this aspect of the decision.
84. Articles 4 and 5 of the Covenant provide for unanimity in voting.
85. S.W.A. CASES I 337.
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of the members of the League, notwithstanding the dissolution of the League
itself."8 The court reasoned that this resolution was adopted with the express
purpose of continuing the Mandate as a treaty between the Mandatory and
former members of the League.8"
The third preliminary objection was that this case did not involve a "dis-
pute" as envisaged in Article 7 of the Mandate. The Union contended
that the word dispute must be given its generally accepted meaning in a
context of a compulsory jurisdiction clause and that, when so interpreted, it
means a disagreement or conflict between the Mandatory and another
member of the League concerning the legal rights and interests of such other
member. This disagreement, it was argued, did not affect any material
interests of the applicant states or their nationals."8 Furthermore the "obli-
gations imposed for the benefit of the inhabitants" were owed solely to the
League. Thus, the Union's contention was that League members by virtue
of their membership participated in the League's supervision of the Man-
date, but that individually the members had no legal right or interest in the
observance by the Mandatory of its duties to the inhabitants. "
86. Id. at 338. The Court placed considerable emphasis on the circumstances sur-
rounding the dissolution of the League and the Members' awareness that the operation
of the Mandates during the period of transition from the Mandatories to the Trustee-
ship system was bound to be handicapped by legal technicalities and formalities. Sin-
ilarly, the statement by the delegate of South Africa, at the second plenary meeting of
the Assembly on April 9, 1946, was held to be a clear recognition on the part of the
Government of South Africa of the continuance of its obligation under the Mandate
Ifor South West Africa, including Article 7, after the dissolution of the League. Here
the delegate had announced that the Union would regard the dissolution of the League
as in no way diminishing its obligations under the Mandate and that it would continue
to fufill its obligations as it had done in the past. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 33
(1946).
87. S.W.A. CASES I 341.
While the majority rejected any implication that League members were actual parties
to the original Mandate agreement, S.W.A. CASES I 332, Judge Jessup proffered a legal
basis for recognition of Applicants' standing under the original Mandate. Relying on
the Free Zones cases, Free Zones of Savoy and District of Gex, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 46, Judge Jessup found precedent for applying the third-party beneficiary
doctrine of contract law to treaties and conventions. S.W.A. CASES I 409 (Jessup,
separate opinion).
Various theories have been advanced by the text-writers which lend authority to the
Court's pronouncement. See Q. WRIGHT, supra note 55, at 158; Hale, The Creation
and Application of the Mandate System, 25 TRANSACT. GROT. Soo'Y 185, 256 (1939);
Keith, Mandates, 4 J. Comp. LEo. & INTL L. 71, 82 (1922).
88. S.W.A. CASES I 343. As more succintly stated in the pleadings, South Africa
contended:
The provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant and those of the Mandate itself
appear to exclude the possiblity that League Members were intended to have a
legal interest in matters not affecting their material interests, that is in matters which
could affect only the inhabitants. S.W.A. CASES, PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS,
AND DOCUMENTS [1962] I.C.J. 243.
89. S.W.A. CAsEs I 343.
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The Court met these objections by maintaining that the Union's con-
tentions were contrary to the natural and ordinary meaning of the pro-
visions of Article 7, which mentions "any dispute whatever" arising between
the Mandatory and another member "relating to the interpretation or the
application of the provisions of the Mandate."9 It found the right to legal
action as conferred by Article 7 on member states of the League, to be an
essential and inseparable part of the Mandate, 1 with the role of the Court
as a "final bulwark of protection... against possible abuse or breaches of
the Mandate."92
The fourth preliminary objection was that this dispute was not one which
"cannot be settled by negotiation" with the Applicants within the meaning
of Article 7. There had been no such negotiations with a view to its settle-
ment.93 The Applicants conceded that even though the various discussions
in the United Nations General Assembly about South West Africa had not
been profitable, direct negotiations between the parties had never been
tried." To answer this objection the Court relied on the factual situation
stating, in effect, that parliamentary diplomacy was as adequate as direct
diplomatic exchanges at the state level.9" The Court emphasized that it is
90. Id.. The Court felt that the language in Article 7 was broad, clear and precise,
giving rise to no ambiguity and permitting no exceptions:
It refers to any dispute whatever relating not to any one particular provision
or provisions, but to "the provisions" of the Mandate, obviously meaning all or
any provisions, whether they relate to substantive obligations of the Mandatory
towards the inhabitants of the Territory or towards the other Members of the
League or to its obligation to submit to supervision by the League under Article
6 or to protection under Article 7 itself. Id.
But such a firm and positive statement by the majority seems a bit strange in view
of the fact that seven dissenting judges took the opposite view on exactly the same
point.
91. Id. at 344.
92. Id. at 336. The dissenters took the defensible position that the disputes envisaged
by Article 7 were disputes in the traditional sense of the term, i.e., disputes between
the actual parties before the court about their own interests, such as the protection of
their own rights and the rights of their nationals. Id. at 455, 463, 559, 569, 659-60.
93. President Winiarski, in his dissenting opinion, stated:
By negotiations between States, however, it can only be possible to settle dis-
putes in which the parties can deal freely with their rights and their interests.
The condition laid down in Article 7 (this article refers to a dispute which "cannot
be settled by negotiation"] decisively proves that that Article envisages only legal
cases in the true, the only universally accepted sense of the expression, where States,
believing themselves to possess legally protected rights and interests, and which
have been unable to settle their disputes by negotiation, ask the Court to decide
as between them. S.W.A. CASES I 457 (Winiarksi, dissenting opinion).
94. Id. at 346.
95. The Court said:
Moreover, diplomacy by conference or parliamentary diplomacy has come to be
recognized in the past four or five decades as one of the established modes of
international negotiation. In cases where the disputed questions are of common
interest to a group of States on one side or the other in an organized body, par-
liamentary or conference diplomacy has often been found to be the most practical
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not so much the form of negotiation that mattered as the attitude and views
of the parties on the substantive issues involved: "So long as both sides
remain adamant... there is no reason to think that the dispute can be set-
tled by further negotiations between the Parties." 8
Thus, the Court found itself competent to determine the important issue:
does the practice of apartheid, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the
duties which South Africa agreed to assume under the terms of the Man-
date?
III. THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
On July 18, 1966, the Court dismissed the case in a forty-nine page
opinion," asserting that the Applicants did not possess any legal right or
interest in the subject matter of their claims.
The rights possessed by the Applicants, of course, included those which
were conferred directly upon the members of the League as individual
states, or in favor of their nationals, by "special interests" provisions in the
mandates.9" The Court, however, distinguished these "special interests"
provisions from other provisions which defined the mandatory's obligations
to the inhabitants of the Territory and to the League.9 The latter were
known as the "conduct" provisions. The Court concluded that the issue to
be resolved was whether any legal right or interest was vested in members of
the League individually under the "conduct" provisions of the mandates
which would entitle individual member nations to exact compliance with
the terms of the mandate from the mandatories.10°
The Applicants contended that they had a legal right or interest in the
conduct of the mandate because of the mere existence of the "sacred
form of negotiation. The number of parties to one side or the other of a dispute
is of no importance; it depends upon the nature of the question at issue. If it is
one of mutual interest to many States, whether in an organized body or not, there
is no reason why each one of them should go through the formality and pretence
of direct negotiation with the common adversary State after they have already
fully participated in the collective negotiations with the same State in opposition.
Id.
96. Id.
97. S.W.A. CASES II 6. Since the Applicants appeared before the Court in their
special capacity as former members of the League, claiming rights said to have vested
at the time of the League, the Court was required to act as if the case arose at the
point in time when the mandates system was instituted. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 20. Special interests provisions contained rights "of the same kind as are
to be found in certain provisions of ordinary treaties of commerce, establishment and
navigation concluded between States." Id. "Their [special interests provisions'] primary
object was to benefit the individual members of the League and their nationals. Any
action or intervention on the part of member States in this regard would be for that
purpose-not in furtherance of the mandate as such." Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 20.
100. Id. at 22.
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trust."1 ' The Court disagreed, holding that the "sacred trust" remains
only a moral or humanitarian ideal, lacking any judicial expression or legal
form. This thereby gives rise to no enforceable rights and obligations out-
side the mandate system as a whole." 2
In light of the judicial character and structure of the League, the Court
found that, by virtue of Article 2 of the Covenant, 0 3 member states were
precluded from individual action with respect to League matters."0 ' Indi-
vidual member states could take part in the administrative process only
through their participation in the activities of League organs, but had no
right of direct intervention in the administration of mandatories, for such
was solely the prerogative of the League organs °5
Similarly, the Court rejected the suggestion that when the League dis-
solved, the rights previously vested in the League itself (or its competent
organs) inured to the individual states which were members at the date of
dissolution." 6 The members of a dissolved international organization can
be deemed to retain only rights which they individually possessed when the
organization was extant. The Court would not interprete the unilateral
declarations (or statements of intention) made by the various mandatories
on dissolution of the League, which expressed their willingness to continue
to be guided by the mandates in their administration of the territories con-
cerned, as conferring on the members individually any new legal rights or
interests."' 7 Furthermore, the Court found that nothing had occurred after
the dissolution of the League to vest in its members rights they did not pre-
viously have.""
With respect to the contention that the Applicants' legal right or interest
had been settled by the 1962 judgment and could not be reopened, the
Court pointed out that a decision on a preliminary objection could never
be conclusive of an issue pertaining to the merits, whether or not it had in
fact been dealt with in connection with preliminary objections."0 ' By virtue
of Article 62, paragraph 3, of the Court's rules, "when preliminary objec-
101. Id. at 34. Applicants contended that the "sacred trust" in Article 22 of the
Covenant was a "sacred trust of civilization" and thus all nations had an interest in
seeing that it was carried out. For the text of Article 22, see note 134 infra.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Article 2 of the Covenant provided that the "action of the League under this
Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council,
with a permanent Secretariat." COVENANT art. 2.
104. S.W.A. CASES II 23, 24.
105. Id. at 26.
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 36.
109. Id.
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tions are entered by the defendant party in a case, the proceedings on the
merits are . . . suspended.""'  Until the proceedings on the merits are
resumed, there can be no decision finally determining or prejudging any
issue on the merits.11' Thus, the Court found no contradiction between a
decision that the Applicants had the capacity to invoke the jurisdictional
clause and a decision that the Applicants had not established a legal basis
for their claim on the merits."
12
Turning to the contention that the jurisdictional clause-Article 7(2)-
of the Mandate conferred a substantive right to compel the Mandatory to
carry out the "conduct" provisions, the Court observed that it would be
remarkable if so important a right had been created so indirectly and in
such a casual fashion."1 3 The Court could not distinguish this particular
jurisdictional clause from many others. It stated that it was an almost ele-
mentary principle of procedural law that a distinction had to be made
between the right to activate a court and examine the merits of a claim,
and the plaintiff's legal right with respect to the subject matter of the claim,
which would have to be established to the satisfaction of the Court.
The Court, after dismissing tangential contentions of the Applicants, 5
directed itself to the final contention: the so-called argument of "neces-
sity.2)' l It was suggested that since the Council never had a means of im-
posing its views on the Mandatory, and since no advisory opinion of the
Court would be binding on the Mandatory, the Mandate could have been
flouted at will. Hence, it was essential as an ultimate safeguard for the
"sacred trust" that each member have a legal right to take direct action.1"
The Court felt the argument was obviously misconceived because the man-
110. Id. at 37.
111. Id. The Court pointed out that a judgment on a preliminary objection might
touch on a point of merits, but this it could do only in a provisional way, to the extent
necessary for deciding the question raised by the preliminary objection.
112. Id. at 38.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 39. The Court also compared the rights of members of the League
Council under the jurisdictional clauses of the Minorities Treaties signed after the First
World War, with their rights under the jurisdictional clauses of the mandate instruments.
In the case of the mandates, the jurisdictional clause was intended to give the individual
members of the League the means of protecting their "special interests" relative to the
mandated territories; in the case of the Minorities Treaties, the right of action of the
members of the Council under the jurisdictional clauses were intended for the protection
of minority populations. Id. at 40, 41.
115. Id. at 41, 42. These contentions dealt with the legislative history of the man-
dates.
116. Id. at 44.
117. Id. at 46.
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date system was expressly designed to exclude the kind of enforcement
which, according to the "necessity" argument, was essential. 18 It was
never intended that the mandatories should be answerable to individual
League members; otherwise, any individual member could independently
invoke the jurisdiction of the Court by alleging misconduct, even if the
Council of the League was perfectly satisfied with the way in which a man-
datory was carrying out its mandate. 19 Moreover, it was noted that the
"necessity" argument amounts to a plea that the Court should recognize
the equivalent of an actio popularis-the right of any member in a com-
munity to take legal action in vindication of a public wrong.12 Such a right,
while known in certain municipal systems of law, has never existed in inter-
national law, and the Court held that it was not implied in the "general
principles of law" referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 (c) of its Statute."'
The Court finally determined the whole "necessity" argument to be based
on considerations of an extra-legal nature, "the product of a process of
afterthought." ' Such a theory was never officially advanced during the
period of the League, but rather it was subsequent events alone, not any-
thing inherent in the mandates system, that gave rise to the alleged "neces-
sity." Further, the Court was of the opinion that this necessity, if it does
exist, lies in the political field and does not constitute necessity in the eyes of
the law. 2'
Summary disposition was made of the last contention, that the Court is
empowered to supply an omission resulting from the failure of the framers
of the Mandate to foresee what was to occur. The Court merely said that
it "cannot however presume what the wishes and intentions of those con-
cemed would have been in anticipation of events that were neither foreseen
nor foreseeable; and even if it could, it would certainly not be possible to
make the assumptions in effect contended for by the Applicants as to what
those intentions were. 1 24
118. Id. Compare notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 46-47.
120. Id. at 47.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 47.
123. Id. at 47. The Court further stated:
It is always open to parties to a dispute, if they wish the Court to give a decision
on a basis of ex aequo et bono, and are so agreed, to invoke the power which, in
those circumstances, paragraph 2 of this same Article 38 confers on the Court
to give a decision on that basis, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1.
Failing that, the duty of the Court is plain. Id. at 48.
124. Id. at 48-49.
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IV. THE MERITS OF THE CASE
The Applicants alleged in their Memorial a cause of action based on a
"norm of non-discrimination or non-separation" and on certain undefined
"standards."'12 It became clear that the Applicants' whole case with respect
to the alleged contraventions of the Mandate was based on the existence of
either a "norm" or "standards" when the Applicants' agent said: "The
issue before the Court, accordingly, is whether the processes of the organized
international community have or have not eventuated in international
standards or an international legal norm, or both." 2'
Applicants contended that the alleged "standards" were binding on re-
spondent by reason of an implied agreement in the Mandate itself, under
which the Mandatory was bound to submit to guidelines laid down by the
supervisory authority.127 Applicants' "norm" contention indicated that
Respondent was obliged under the Mandate to govern in accordance with
international law. Consequently any legal norm binding upon Respondent
as the administrating authority in respect of South West Africa would be
enforceable under Article 7(2) of the Mandate.12 The only difference
between the two concepts was that the "standards" were argued to be ap-
plicable only to South Africa as a Mandatory, whereas the "norm" was said
to be binding on all states, including Respondent in its capacity as a sov-
ereign state.'
Even though a majority of the Court dismissed the case without resolving
these two allegations, both concurring and dissenting opinions, in dicta, did
discuss these issues.
125. S.W.A. CASES II 15. Applicants' Submission No. 4 reads as follows:
Respondent, by virtue of economic, political, social, and educational policies applied
within the Territory, by means of laws and regulations, and official methods and
measures, which are set out in the pleadings herein, has, in the light of applicable
international standards or international legal norm, or both, failed to promote to
the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants
of the Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated
in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that Respondent
has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to take all practicable
action to fulfil its duties under such Articles.
Non-discrimination and non-separation were defined as follows:
In the following analysis of the relevant legal norms, the terms "non-discrimina-
tion" or "non-separation" are used in their prevalent and customary sense: stated
negatively, the terms refer to the absence of governmental policies or actions which
allot status, rights, duties, privileges or burdens on the basis of membership in a
group, class or race rather than on the basis of individual merit, capacity or poten-
tial: stated affirmatively, the terms refer to governmental policies and actions the
objective of which is to protect equality of opportunity and equal protection of the
laws to individual persons as such. Id. at 142 (Van Wyk, separate opinion).
126. Id. at 145. (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 157.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 159.
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A. Did South Africa Breach Mandate Standards?
1. Purpose of the Mandates System.
The underlying purposes for the establishment of the mandates system
have been the subject of much comment, with theories ranging from "a
new contrivance for ordinary annexation"'e3 to the advancement of the
well-being of backward people.' Apparently the mandates were created
"in the interest of the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in gen-
eral, as an international institution with an international object-a sacred
trust of civilization."'32 Support for this view has been gleaned from the
principles laid down by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
which are applicable to territories inhabited by peoples not able to provide
for their own well-being and development. 3 ' In the opening paragraph of
Article 22,"a the terms "sacred trust" and "tutelage" would appear to be
130. W. KENNEDY & H. SCHLOSBERG, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SOUTH AFRI-
CAN CONSTrrUTION 511 (1935).
131. See E. VAN MAANEN-HELMER, THE MANDATE SYSTEM 41 (1929), where the
author is of the opinion that the mandates system embodies two fundamental principles:
"that the advanced peoples of the world shall secure the well-being and development of
the backward peoples, and that the resources of the undeveloped portions of the earth
shall be used for the benefit of the world as a whole."
See also Rappard, Human Rights in Mandated Territories, 243 ANNALS 118, 119
(Jan. 1946) wherein the author expresses still another view:
This system, it should be recalled, was not set up primarily for the protection of
human rights, but for the settlement of rival political claims. . . . At the Peace
Conference, the victors, with various degrees of insistence, were inclined to demand
the annexation of the territories they had occupied. As President Wilson had re-
peatedly declared that the war was not being fought for, and should not lead to, the
territorial aggrandizement of the victors, he consistently opposed these requests.
The result of the discussion which ensued was a compromise: the victors retained
possession of the respective territories they had conquered, but consented to admin-
ister them not as sovereign masters but as mandatories on behalf of the League of
Nations and under specific, internationally agreed conditions. (emphasis added).
132. S.W.A. STATUS 128, 132. The governing principles of the system are to be found
in the English conception of trust rather than in the Roman conception of agency with
respect to the administrative of property. N. BENTWIYCH, THE MANDATE SYSTEM 7
(1930). See also M. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP 97-100
(1948); Q. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 389 (1930); Brierly,
Trust and Mandates, Bmrt. Y. B. INT'L L. 217-19 (1929).
133. W. KENNEDY & H. SCHLOSBERO, supra note 130, at 512, wherein it is stated:
Practical effect is given to these principles by entrusting the tutelage of such peoples
to advanced nations who are in a position to undertake the responsibility; such
tutelage to be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.... The
degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory is
to be defined by the council, and the mandatory is to make an annual report to the
council "in reference to the territory committed to its charge," which report is to be
examined by a permanent commission constituted to advise the council on all mat-
ters relating to the observance of the mandate.
134. Article 22 of the Covenant provides:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and
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more than merely descriptive of the idealistic or humanitarian objectives of
the mandate system. While the terms obviously import a high moral value,
there is authority for the proposition that they were intended to have some
legal significance as well.' This proposition was accepted by the Court in
its 1962 decision,"' thus adding judicial significance to the contention that
which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenu-
ous conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the principle that the
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and
that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Cove-
nant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage
of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their
resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this
responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be
exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the develop-
ment of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condi-
tions, and other similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provision-
ally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the
Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under condi-
tions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the
maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave
trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establish-
ment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the
natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also
secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the
League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific
Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or
their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to
the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered
under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the
safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual
report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Man-
datory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be ex-
plicitly defined in each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the an-
nual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating
to the observance of the mandates.
135. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MANDATES SYSTEM, ORIGIN-PRiNcIPLEs-APPLICA-
TION 12-13 (1945). See also A. MAROALITH, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE 198 (1930).
136. The essential principles of the Mandates System consist chiefly in the recog-
nition of certain rights of the peoples of the underdeveloped territories; the estab-
lishment of a regime of tutelage for each of such peoples to be exercised by an
advanced nation as a "Mandatory" "on behalf of the League of Nations"; and the
recognition of a "sacred trust of civilization" laid upon the League as an organized
international community and upon its Member States. This system is dedicated to
the avowed object of promoting the well-being and development of the peoples con-
cerned and is fortified by setting up safeguards for the protection of their rights.
These features are inherent in the Mandates System as conceived by its authors
and as entrusted to the respective organs of the League and the Member States for
application. The rights of the Mandatory in relation to the mandated territory and
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a mandatory is responsible both to the inhabitants and to the members of
the League'37 in the exercise of its administrative authority in a manner
conducive to the avowed aims of the mandate-insuring the well-being and
development of the peoples inhabiting the territories in question. 38
2. The "Standards" Contention
In support of their "standards" contention, Applicants argued that the
Mandate provides by implication that the organized international com-
munity in general, and the competent supervisory organ referred to in
Article 6 of the Mandate in particular,3 9 were empowered to enact legal
rules relative to the administration of the territory to which the Respondent
was obliged to give effect. Secondly, the Applicants contended that, inas-
much as the Respondent was a member of the United Nations and the
International Labour Organization,14 ° it was not only bound by the con-
stitutions of these institutions but also by "the authoritative interpretation
thereof" by the organs of these institutions; therefore, the provisions of the
constitutions of these institutions, so interpreted, were standards binding un
the Respondent in its administration of South West Africa. The Applicants
the inhabitants have their foundation in the obligations of the Mandatory and they
are, so to speak, mere tools given to enable it to fulfil its obligations. The fact is
that each Mandate under the Mandates System constitutes a new international insti-
tution, the primary, overriding purpose of which is to promote "the well-being and
development" of the people of the territory under Mandate. S.W.A. CASES I 329.
However, this view was rejected (or at least modified) in the 1966 decision. S.W.A.
CASES II 35.
137. See N. BENTWICr, supra note 132, at 5. See also 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CHIEFLY AS INTuas'nTED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 102-03 (2d ed.
1945).
138. LEAGuE oF NATIONS, supra note 135, at 23-24:
Like guardians in civil law, they must exercise their authority in the interests of
their wards-that is to say, of the peoples which are regarded as minors--and must
maintain an entirely disinterested attitude in their dealings with them. The terri-
tories with the adminstraton of which they are entrusted must not be exploited by
them for their own profit.
139. Article 6 of the Mandate provides:
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual
report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to
the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations as-
sumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5. MANDATE art. 6.
140. The Applicants based the argument with regard to the International Labor Or-
ganization on the following provision from the Declaration of Philadelphia:
[A]II human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue
both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of free-
dom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.... S.W.A. CASES II
166.
However, the Court found that the wording did not support the Applicants' "standards"
contention.
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further contended that in any event the legal effect of the League resolution
of 18 April 1946, which referred to Chapters XI, XII and XIII'" of the
Charter, is that the Mandate "must be read in the light of the Charter."'"
Only three members of the Court discussed the "standards" contention in
detail. Judge Van Wyk, in a separate concurring opinion, found that
neither the League Council" 3 and its appointed Permanent Mandates Com-
mission' -" nor the General Assembly of the United Nations45 ever had the
competence to "prescribe from time to time standards binding upon the
mandatories in general, or upon any particular mandatory.""' Van Wyk
also found that membership in the International Labour Organization or
the United Nations did not bind South Africa to any acceptable standard
found in the respective Constitution.'. and Charter48 of these organizations.
With regard to the latter he said that "the Charter does not purport to lay
down or define human rights and fundamental freedoms" and that "sub-
sequent attempts at drafting comprehensive and legally effective instruments
for this purpose have not proved successful."' 49
Thus, "the whole concept of 'human rights and fundamental freedoms'
is as yet an undefined and uncertain one with no clear content."'50
Even in his dissent, Judge Tanaka agreed that the concept of the pro-
motion of "material and moral well being and social progress of the in-
habitants," which is the objective of the Mandate (Article 2, para. 2), is
itself essentially of political character and therefore incapable of judicial
review.'' However, Judge Jessup, in his lone dissent, looked to pronounce-
ments of the United Nations in determining a standard to be used in inter-
preting Article 2 of the Mandate.' Thus, Judge Jessup concluded:
141. Judge Van Wyk answered this argument in his concurring opinion:
It [the resolution] did no more than to note that Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the
Charter embodied "principles" "corresponding" to those declared in Article 22 of
the Covenant. S.W.A. CASES 11 168 (Van Wyk, separate opinion).
142. S.W.A. CASES 11 159 (Van Wyk, separate opinion).
143. Id. at 161.
144. Id. at 163.
145. Id. at 165.
146. Id. at 161.
147. Id. at 166.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. S.W.A. CASES II 281 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion).
152. S.W.A. CASES II 441 (Jessup, dissenting opinion). Respondent agreed that
"the effect of obtaining the agreement of an organization like the United Nations would,
for all practical purposes, be the same as obtaining the consent of all the members
individually, and that would probably be of decisive practical value, for the United
Nations represents most of the civilized States of the world." Id.
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The task of passing upon Applicants' third submission which asserts
that the practice of apartheid is in violation of the Mandatory's ob-
ligations as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, is a justiciable issue, not just a
political question. Therefore, the legal interest of Applicants in the
proper administration of the Mandate... was properly invoked ....3
B. Is There an International Norm of Human Rights?
The basic issue in the "norm" contention was whether there was some
norm of positive international law which would place South Africa in
breach of any duty it might have by the practice of apartheid in the man-
dated territory. To determine this, the Court needed to find a respect for
the human rights of the individual as evidenced in either convention or gen-
eral customary international law.
1. Political Disputes
Unless a norm of positive international law by which to judge the issue
of apartheid exists," ' the Court apparently would be forced to resolve a
political, as opposed to a legal, question, which, lacking the consent of the
parties,"'5 is manifestly without its power to accomplish.'
There is no generally accepted definition of "legal disputes." Definitions
offered range from "those in which the dispute as to the respective rights of
the parties is governed by a fairly definite rule of law,"'"' to "those in which
all the parties believe they can satisfy their interests better by the application
of law than by some other means."'58 One effort to establish an accepted
definition was Article 1 of the Locarno Treaties of 1925, which considered
legal disputes to be "all disputes of every kind . . .with regard to which
the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights." ' This criterion
153. Id. at 442.
154. There is a split of opinion on the qustion of whether the "norm" of international
law must have existed at the time of the establishment of the Mandate or not. Some
dissenting opinions clearly took the position that "norms" arising subsequent to the estab-
lishment of the Mandate are applicable to this case. S.W.A. CASES II 293-94, 439
(Tanaka and Jessup, dissenting opinions).
155. This authorization is found in Article 38(2) of the Statute of the Court which
provides for settlement of a dispute ex aequo et bono with the parties' consent.
156. S.W.A. CASES II 279, 439 (Tanaka and Jessup, dissenting opinions).
157. Fenwick, The Distinction Between Legal and Political Questions, 18 Paoo. Am.
SOc'Y INT'L L. 44 (1924).
158. Wright, The Distinction between Legal and Political Questions with Especial
Reference to the Monroe Doctrine, 18 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 57 (1924). One author
has also noted a definite tendency to base the distinction between legal and political dis-
putes upon a nation's own self-interest and its own initiation:
If the question does not affect what the nation may deem to be its vital interests
or if it has less to lose by a judicial settlement than by war or other political
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has been subsequently criticized as creating the false impression that legal
disputes can be distinguished from political ones by an objectively ascer-
tainable quality inherent in the conflict. 60 In its stead, a subjective criterion
has been proffered-legal disputes are those in which both parties base
their respective claims and their rejections of the other party's claims on
positive law; whereas political disputes are disputes in which at least one
party bases its claim or defense on principles other than those of positive
international law, i.e., general principles of justice or equity.161
Apparently this criterion was embodied in the formulation of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, for Article 36 (2) restricts the jurisdic-
tion of the Court to all "legal disputes" concerning: (a) the interpretation
of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation. Resolution of these disputes is to be
made in accordance with Article 38, which, inter alia, calls for the applica-
tion of international conventions and principles of customary international
law. Thus, it would appear that the legal or political character of a dispute
is to depend, not upon its substance, but rather upon the norms which are
to be applied to it; i.e., the dispute is legal if it is to be decided according to
norms of positive international law, whereas it is political if it is to be de-
cided according to other norms, such as principles of justice and equity.Y2
method, it will be submitted and will by many for that reason be called legal....
Thus, what is known as a political question becomes a legal question solely because
there is a willingness, induced by any one of many considerations counselling self-
restraint, to have it peaceably settled. Borchard, The Distinction between Legal and
Political Questions, 18 PROc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 50,53 (1924).
159. For text see Final Protocol of The Locarno Conference 1925, 20 AAx. J. INT'L
L. 21, 26 (Supp. Off. Doss. 1920).
160. Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 Am. J. INT'L L.
397, 402-03 (1943).
161. Id. at 403.
162. H. KELsEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS 478-79 (1950). The author
notes an exception to the general proscription against entertainment of a political ques-
tion in the case of an agency authorized by a norm of international law to decide a dis-
pute according to the principles of justice and equity. In such a case the principles
applied assume the character of international law with the decision of the agency assum-
ing legal character. This is an instance of an agency creating law for the specific case,
and thus the difference between so-called "legal" and "political" disputes is only a differ-
ence between two kinds of legal disputes: disputes to be settled in accordance with pre-
existent law, that is law as it exists at the time the dispute arises, and disputes to be
settled in accordance with the law to be created by the competent authority for the set-
tlement of the dispute.
A somewhat more expansive interpretation has been given to "political dispute" by
some authors, who consider it to entail any disagreement which relates not to the applica-
tion of the rules of international law, but rather to the adequacy of the existing legal
order. In other words, the disagreement arises from the dissatisfaction with the applicable
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2. Possible Bases for an International Norm
a. Historical custom. In international law a principle becomes enforce-
able through the practice of custom or convention. With regard to human
rights, their short history has not been followed by any great progress in
the realization of human rights as legal rights in many countries. In fact,
one noted author commented of the last decade: "[T]he present conditions
of life in most countries of the world show a denial of human rights to most
people."'83 This same author also contends that before the modern inter-
national community received its first constitution under the League, human
rights did not appear as a distinct set of rules within the law of nations but
remained subject to municipal law alone." 4
With the exception of a few rare cases of collective intervention, early
customary international law did not provide for protection of the individual
against the oppression of his own government.' This was due to the fact
that the principle of sovereignty recognized the right of a state to exercise
its unfettered jurisdiction within its own territory, save only for the obscure
doctrine of humanitarian intervention in cases where a state maltreats its
subjects in such a way as to shock the conscience of mankind.' Customary
law did, however, provide for the protection of the human rights of foreign-
ers, "authorizing the State of which they were nationals to intervene diplo-
matically in order to secure for them certain minimum standards of treat-
ment."' 67 This concept undoubtedly provided the basis for a number of
treaties which contained recognition of human rights by providing for
religious freedom and the cultural and political rights of minorities.'
rules of law. L. GOODRICH & E. HAMERO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 257
(1949).
163. P. DROsT, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 14 (1951).
164. Id. at 15.
165. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312-13 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1958).
166. This principle has had its advocates beginning with Grotius, but its application
has been sporadic, limited to the most severe instances, such as intervention in behalf of the
Greek people in 1827 and, subsequently, in behalf of the oppressed Armenians in Turkey.
See Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of
of the European Convention, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUIAN RIGHTS 23
(1965).
167. Id.
168. E.g., Treaty of Berlin (1878); Treaty of Paris (1856); Congress of Aix-la-
Chapelle (1818); Treaty of Vienna (1815); Treaty of Westphalia (1648); Treaty of
Augsburg (1555). For a detailed survey of these treaties, see O. JANOVSKY & M. FAGEN,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN RACIAL POLICIES 6-27 (1937); C. MACARTNEY,
NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 156-75 (1934).
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b. Unilateral declarations. The modem view of the international com-
munity, as manifested in the declarations of world organizations, 6 ' govern-
ments, 70 scholars,' jurists,'72 authors,' 7 and scientists,7  reflects a general
condemnation of the practice of discrimination on the basis of race, creed
or color. The late Hersch Lauterpacht wrote: "The moral claims of today
are often the legal rights of tomorrow."' 75 Yet, mere declarations of moral
turpitude create no legal obligations. The world community has not yet
progressed to the point at which human rights are afforded any positive
standard of customary international law by which violations can be ascer-
tained. Perhaps this can be attributed to the reluctance of nation-states to
surrender some of their sovereignty to a collective agency such as the United
Nations, because the enforcement of such rights necessarily involves an
169. See G.A. Res. 1979, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 51, U.N. Doe. A/5515 (1963);
G.A. Res. 1899, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 46, U.N. Doe. A/5515 (1963); G.A. Res.
1806, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 39, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1805, 17
U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 38, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1703, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 17, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res. 1702, 16 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 17, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res. 1596, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A,
at 7, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) : G.A. Res. 1593, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 7, U.N.
Doe. A/4684 (1961); G.A. Res. 1565, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 31-32, U.N. Doe.
A/4684 (1960).
170. China: 13 U.N. SCOR, 1053rd meeting 41 (1958); France: 15 U.N. SCOR,
854th meeting 2-3 (1960); Greece: 13 U.N. GAOR, Special Pol. Comm. 20 (1958);
Ireland: 16 U.N. GAOR, Special Pol. Comm. 83 (1961); Malaya: 17 U.N. GAOR,
Special Pol. Comm. 49 (1962); Mexico: 16 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 98 (1961); The
Netherlands: 17 U.N. GAOR, Special Pol. Comm. 38 (1962); Norway: 18 U.N. SCOR,
1055th meeting 6-7 (1963); Pakistan: 17 U.N. GAOR, Special Pol. Comm. 22 (1962);
15 U.N. SCOR, 852nd meeting 30 (1960); Poland: 14 U.N. GAOR, Special Pol.
Comm. 49 (1959); United Kingdom: 17 U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 332 (1962); 15
U.N. GAOR, 4th Comm. 83 (1960); United States: 18 U.N. GAOR 31 (1963); 18
U.N. SCOR, 1052th meeting 31 (1963).
171. C. Dr KIEwIET, THE ANATOMY OF SOUTH AFRICAN MISERY 47-49 (1956);
R. DoxEY, THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR IN SOUTH AFRICA 200 (1961); Brooks,
South Africa and the Wider Africa, 1910-1960, 27 RACE RELATIONS J. 8 (Jan.-March
1960); Thompson, Fifty Years of Union, 27 RACE RELATIONS J. 66-67 (April-June
1960); Wilson, The Principle of Maintaining the Reserves for the African, 28 RAc.
RELATIONS J. 8-9 (Jan.-March 1962).
172. H. FAGAN, OUR RESPONSIBMITY: A DISCUSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RACIAL
PROBLEMS 47 (1960). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
173. E. CALLAN, ALBERT JOHN LUTHULI AND THE SOUTH AFRICA RAciE CONFLICT
57-58 (1962); A. LUTHULr, LET MY PEOPLE Go: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 202, 245 (1962) ;
E. MPHAHLELE, THE AFRICAN IMAGE 33-34 (1962); A. PATON, THE PEOPLE WEPT
44 (1958); P. VAN RENsBURGH, GUILTY LAND; THE HISTORY OF APARTHEID 138-39
(1962).
174. 3. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 47 (2d ed. 1963); I. MAC CRONE,
RACE ATTITUDES IN SOUTH AFRICA 261 (1937); R. MAC IVER, THE WEB OF GOVERN-
MENT 428 (1947); P. TOBIAS, THE MEANING OF RACE 22, 48-49 (1961).
175. H. LAUTERPAGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 74 (1951).
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intrusion by the international community into matters of traditionally
domestic concern. Moreover, any immediate attempt to enforce such an
all-embracing concept as "moral rights" would tend to prove somewhat
impractical since the moral rights of men in some communities differ from
the moral rights of men in other communities;17 the need for international
legislation is readily apparent.
c. Natural rights. In the words of Jacques Maritain, human rights are
universal in that they belong to a man simply because he is a man:
The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is
a person, a whole, master of itself and of its acts, and which conse-
quently is not merely a means to an end, but an end, an end which
must be treated.as such. The dignity of the human person? The ex-
pression means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of natural
law, the human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of
such rights, possesses rights. These are things which are owed to man
because of the very fact that he is manY"
Echoing Maritain, Judge Tanaka, in accepting the Applicants' alterna-
tive contention that the alleged legal norm was cognizable under the terms
of Article 38 (i) (c) of the Statute ("the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations"),8 reasoned that the principle of protection of
human rights is derived from the concept of man as a person and his
relationship with society which cannot be separated from universal human
nature. The existence of human rights does not depend upon the will of
the state as expressed in its laws and other legislative measures, or in its
treaties or customs. Under such a view it would appear that states are
incapable of creating human rights by law or convention and can only
confirm their existence and give them protection: "The role of the State
is no more than declaratory." '79 Human rights, then, belong to that
category of law known as jus cogens, which are incapable of being changed
by way of agreement between states;. 8 whether such rights are expressly
recognized or not they constitute "general principles of law" to which
176. M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARn HUMAN RIGHTS 74 (1962).
177. J. MARITAIN, THE IGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 37 (1943).
178. S.W.A. CASES II 300 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion).
179. Id. at 297.
180. Id. at 298.
181. Id. It is in this respect that S. Rosenne comments:
Having independent existence, their validity as legal norms does not derive
from the consent of the parties as such .... The Statute places this element on a
footing of formal equality with two positivist elements of custom and treaty, and
thus is positivist recognition of the Grotian concept of the co-existence implying
no subjugation of positive law and so-called natural law of nations in the Grotian
sense. II S. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 610 (1965).
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nations are subject.""' Extending this concept, Tanaka said that his analysis
of human rights in general can be applied to the principle of equality,
thus giving a basis for a norm of non-discrimination."
Unfortunately, the world community has successfully negated any attempt
to identify natural or moral rights with any aspects of enforceable rights.
Certainly customary international law cannot be said to have progressed to
the point where these rights have been completely inculcated in legal rights
and efforts to promulgate conventions which would fill this void have met
with little success. Nor can it be contended that the principle of protection
of human rights constitutes a principal of law recognized by the nations of
the world, since nation-states have long inflicted upon their minorities op-
pression and abuse. It must, therefore, be concluded that human rights
remain mere ideals, commanding no sanction for their repeated violation.
d. Conventions.
i. Minorities Treaties. Shortly after World War I came the first major
attempt to provide international recognition of basic human rights. In con-
junction with the peace settlements and the formation of the League, four-
teen nations"83 "agreed" to accept specific obligations with respect to
minorities within their own territories, guaranteeing life, liberty, and free-
dom of religion to all inhabitants within their territorial boundaries, and
ensuring the treatment of their nationals on a basis of perfect equality." 4
Thus, the foundation of the new structure of minority protection appears
to have been equality in rights, with the ultimate goal being prevention of
discrimination on the basis not only of religion but also of race and lan-
guage.'85
Using the Treaty of Poland as a model for all other Minorities Treaties,"8
and equality as a guiding principle, the signatories stipulated that the pro-
visions of the Treaties constituted binding obligations. The Treaties were
placed under the guarantee of the League, and any member of the Council
182. S.W.A. CASES II 300 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion), citing C. JENKS, THE Com-
MON LAw OF MANKIND 121 (1958), for the proposition that the principle of respect for
human rights includes equality before the law as a general principle of law.
183. The signatories were as follows: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Esthonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumani, Turkey,
Yugoslavia.
184. Waldock, supra note 166, at 4.
185. 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 168, at 28-29.
186. For text, see 3. ROBINSON, 0. KARnACH, M. LASERSON, N. ROBINSON, M.
VICHNIAK, WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 313-18 (1943) (hereinafter
cited as ROBINSON). See also 0. JANOWSKY, NATIONALITIES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES
112-15 (1945), for a discussion of the rights protected under the Minorities Treaties.
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of the League had the right to bring to its attention any danger of an infrac-
tion of the provisions. The Council was empowered to take such action and
give such directions as it deemed proper and effective. In addition, any
dispute as to the Treaties' application could be referred to the Permanent
Court of International Justice."s7 But to effectuate this commendable plan
necessitated the regulation of "what constitutes the most sensitive sphere of
the political life of a country"'s--that is, the relationship between a state and
its citizens. Each state was required to implement these Treaties as part of
its fundamental constitutional law and to ensure that "no law, regulation,
or official action"' 9 conflicted or interfered with their stipulations, nor pre-
vailed over them.90
The value of the Minorities Treaties in establishing a precedent for the
observance and enforcement of basic human rights is doubtful. Though
the original purpose of the Treaties was quite noble,' later authorities have
concluded that the protection of minorities was but a pawn in the game
of international power politics: "The subordination of the responsibilities
under the treaties to considerations of political necessity or expediency, led
to the complete politicization of what was originally intended to be a great
humanitarian enterprise."'02
. An extensive examination of the basic conceptions underlying the Treaties
and the principal purposes which they were intended to serve, had led two
of the foremost authorities in this area of international law to conclude:
Contrary to what might at first sight be thought its character, as
careful examination of the treaties and especially their application
reveals, the system was neither humanitarian nor juridical. Its essential
aim might have been to shield the minorities from the danger of op-
187. M. Mosxowrrz, -UMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER 95 (1958).
188. P. DE AZOARATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 27 (1945).
189. Treaty with Poland, Art. I, reprinted in RoBINsoN, supra note 186, at 314.
190. Waldock, supra note 166, at 4.
191. The origin and purpose of the Minorities Treaties was authoritatively stated by
George M. Clemenceau, President of the Council of the Peace Conference:
There rests, therefore, upon these Powers an obligation, which they cannot evade,
to secure in the most permanent and solemn form guarantees for certain essential
rights which they will afford to the inhabitants the necessary protection whatever
changes may take place in the internal constitution of the Polish State. LEAGUE
oF NATIONS OFF. J., Special Supp. 73, at 44 (1929).
Similarly, this attitude is reflected in the proposed article submitted by President
Wilson for the Covenant of the League of Nations:
The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as a con-
dition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States to
accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly
the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the
racial or national majority of their people. 2 D. MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE
COVENANT 91, 105 (1928).
192. M. Mosxowrrz, supra note 187, at 118.
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pression by the majorities and from the sufferings, both moral and
material, which such oppression necessarily causes; but in fact its aim
was purely political.'93
and,
. . . [T]he primary objective is the peace of the world; the means
through which this is to be attained, and thus the indirect objectives of
the Treaties, is the internal stability of the Treaty states; and the means
through which this, again, is to be achieved is the wellbeing of the
minorities, which shall make them contented and loyal citizens of the
states of which they form part. The welfare of the minorities is thus,
in a sense, relegated to the third place. . .. '"
Thus, it would appear that protection of minorities was actually conceived
as a means to an end: assurance of internal stability of treaty-states with
a view to securing international peace.19" 5
With a single exception, the provisions of the Treaties were devoted to
ensuring that a nation's minorities would not be victims of discriminatory
treatment by public authorities, 196 hardly constituting a precedent for ob-
servation of universal human rights. However, the exception was a clause
in the Treaties under which the signatory state guaranteed to all its inhabi-
tants full protection of life, liberty, and religious freedom."' Thus, the
Treaties thereby assume a universal character in that this clause makes no
distinction between majority and minorities, but guarantees these basic
freedoms to all alike. If the Minorities Treaties are to be considered a
genuine precedent for recognition and protection of universal human rights,
it would necessarily be solely in this respect.
193. De Azcarate, Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, 243 ANNALS 124
(Jan. 1946) (emphasis added). The author bases this contention on the fact that
since the minorities protected belonged to the same nationalities as those of majorities
in other nations, it was therefore practically inevitable that these states should be
interested in the fate of the minorities. This being a fertile source of quarrels, the
system of international protection of minorities then had as its principal object the
ending of this deplorable state of affairs. In so doing it gave the League of Nations
real authority to examine violations of the minorities treaties.
194. C. MACARTNEY, supra note 168, at 275.
195. Hula, International Law and the Protection of Human Rights, in LAw AND
POLITICS IN THr WORLD COMMUNITY 176 (Lipsky ed. 1953).
196. O. JUNGHANN, NATIONAL MINORITIES IN EUROPE 31 (1932).
197. Treaty with Poland, Art. 2, reprinted in ROBINSON, supra note 186, at 314:
Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to
all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race
or religion.
All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public
or private of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with
public order or public morals.
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Nonetheless, the Minorities Treaties fail to meet the test of establishing a
universal and a definite rule of positive international law. It is difficult to
understand how certain rights can be considered universal when only a
limited number of states were bound to observe them. In the words of one
author:
The stigma of inequality was attached also to the minorities system
of Versailles. It was a special regulation applying to special states, and
not a general system for the protection of minorities everywhere. In
fact, not even all of those states whose dominion has been extended by
the peace treaties had to accept international control over their rela-
tions with newly acquired minorities.19
Also, as the same author points out: "what has been accepted under
duress as a special regime is not voluntarily acceptable even as a genera1
scheme." 99
The Minorities Treaties further fail to establish any positive rule of inter-
national law in that they were merely international agreements whose pur-
pose was to create certain rights for minorities against their own state.2 0 It
has been described as an unsuccessful attempt to impart to treaty law the
standing and force of municipal constitutional law. 0'
Emphasis has been placed on the fact that the authors of the Treaties
neglected to spell out in detail the fundamental rights to be respected.02
This failure to formulate any definite standards can be attributed in no
small measure to the fact that the signatory states maintained that the
Treaties were not self-executing, but rather that they required transforma-
tion into domestic law before their provisions became applicable. They
further maintained that most states neglected to effect their outright trans-
formation.0 '
Any contention that the "guarantee clause" of the Minorities Treaties0 4
provides a basis for universal recognition of human rights must yield to the
patent meaning of the clause. The clause provides that "the stipulations in
the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial;
religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international con-
cern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations." 205
Thus, in spite of the fact that a signatory state guaranteed to all its inhabi-
198. Hula, supra note 195, at 171 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 171.
200. 0. JUNGHANN, supra note 196, at 30-31.
201. See Hula, supra note 195, at 173.
202. Id.
203. RoBINsON, supra note 186, at 187-94.
204. Treaty with Poland, Art. 12, reprinted in ROBINSON, supra note 186, at 316-17.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
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tants the rights to life, liberty and religious freedom, the infringement of any
of these rights was not considered an international concern and could not
lead to intervention by the League unless the victims belonged to a minority
group:
[T]he "guarantee clause" is the clearest indication of the political, not
the humanitarian, character of the protection of minorities by the
League of Nations since the only reasonable explanation of limiting
the intervention of the League to infractions affecting persons belong-
ing to a minority is that these infractions could become a source of in-
ternational difficulties....
ii. United Nations Charter. It has been stated that the United Nations
views the apartheid problem in South Africa as strictly a question of human
rights, or, more appropriately, as a denial of basic human rights and funda-
mental freedoms to an overwhelming majority of the population on the
basis of color and race.0 Justification for United Nations preoccupation
with this policy ostensibly finds its basis in the Charter"'8 which is said to
contain seven specific references to human rights. The Preamble reaffirMs
the faith of the people in the dignity and worth of the human person, and
in the equal rights of men and women of all nations. Article 1 declares that
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"
is a primary purpose of the United Nations. This undertaking is reiterated
in Article 55. In Article 56 all the members pledge to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the United Nations for the achievement
of this end. Articles 13 and 62 direct the General Assembly and the Eco-
nomic and Social Council respectively to "initiate studies and make recom.
mendations" for this purpose, and Article 68 empowers the Council to
establish commissions for the promotion of human rights.2 0 9
206. De Azcarate, supra note 193, at 124, 127. The author, however, feels that for
the purposes of considering the guarantee provision of the Minorities Treaties as a
precedent for a future system of international or supernational protection of human
rights, although the provision could deprive it of sanction by limiting the intervention
of the League to infractions affecting minorities, it did not deprive the provision of its
international character. Id. at 127. The present writer is in full agreement with the
contention that the Minorities Treaties afford a precedent upon which to build a
universal standard for the protection of human rights, but submits that they did not
constitute one in and of themselves.
207. Malkotra, Apartheid and the United Nations, 354 ANNALS 137 (July 1964).
For a complete analysis of the development of apartheid see R. REAME, THE HISTORY
oF APARTHEm (1962).
208. Malkotra, supra note 207, at 138.
209. It may also be pointed out that Article 76 provides as the "basic objectives" of
the trusteeship system the encouragement of respect for human rights.
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It is with respect to these "references" that the contention is raised that
the human rights provisions of the Charter are not "mere embellishments of
an historic document,"21 but rather constitute a binding legal obligation
upon the signatories.21' Within the Charter is found language from which
a mandatory obligation to respect "human rights and fundamental freedom"
is implied.212 Since the Charter constitutes a legal document, it is then
deduced that the repeated affirmations of the "fundamental human rights"
of the individual must be deemed to refer to legal rights recognized by both
international law and the independent law of states." 3
Judge Tanaka in his dissent said that "from the provisions of the Char-
ter referring to the human rights and fundamental freedoms it can be in-
ferred that the legal obligation to respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms is imposed on member States."'2 4 Recognizing the imperfect
nature of the protection of these rights and freedoms Judge Tanaka stated:
Without doubt, under the present circumstances, the international
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is very imper-
fect. The work of codification in this field of law has advanced little
from the viewpoint of defining each human right and freedom, as well
as the machinery for their realization. But there is little doubt of the
existence of human rights and freedoms; if not, respect for these is
210. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, Human Rights, REPORT OF 42ND CONFERENCE,
PRAGUE 1947 14-15 (1948).
211. See Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 L.Q. Rlv. 97, 101
(1948).
212. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147-48 (1950)
where the author states:
Members of the United Nations are under a legal obligation to act in accordance
with these Purposes. It is their legal duty to respect and observe fundamental
human rights and freedoms.... There is a mandatory obligation implied in the pro-
vision of Article 55 that the United Nations 'shall promote respect for, and observ-
ance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms'; or, in the terms of Article 13,
that the Assembly shall make recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the
realisation of human rights and freedoms. There is a distinct element of legal duty
in the undertaking expressed in Article 56 in which 'All Members pledge them-
selves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.'
213. Id. at 159. This view is similarly supported by another eminent authority,
Judge Philip Jessup:
It is already law, at least for Members of the United Nations, that respect for
human dignity and fundamental human right is obligatory. The duty is imposed
by the Charter, a treaty to which they are parties. P. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 91 (1948).
214. S.W.A. CASES II 289 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion). In support of this con-
clusion Tanaka cites Judge Jessup's statement:
Since this book is written de lege ferenda, the attempt is made throughout to dis-
tinguish between the existing law and the future goals of the law. It is already the
law, at least for Members of the United Nations, that respect for human dignity
and fundamental human rights is obligatory. The duty is imposed by the Char-
ter .... P. JESSUP, MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, 91 (1948).
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logically inconceivable; the Charter presupposes the existence of hu-
man rights and freedoms which shall be respected; the existence of
such rights and freedoms is unthinkable without corresponding obliga-
tions of persons concerned and a legal norm underlying them. Further-
more, there is no doubt that these obligations are not only moral ones,
and that they also have a legal character by the very nature of the sub-
ject-matter.
Therefore, the legislative imperfections in the definition of human
rights and freedoms and the lack of mechanism for implementation, do
not constitute a reason for denying their existence and the need for
their legal protection. 15
The Judge found that the "evidence of a general practice" provision of
Article 38(1) (b) ' was sufficiently met by virtue of the accumulation of
authoritative pronouncements such as resolutions, declarations, decisions,
etc., concerning the interpretation of the Charter by the competent organs
of the international community.21 The enumerated resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly condemning the practice of apartheid.8 plus the inclusion in
all the trust territories agreements of a provision concerning the norm of
official non-discrimination on the basis of membership in a group or race1 9
and the various human rights declarations22 were considered sufficient
"evidence of general practices" under the terms of Article 38(1) (b) to
establish a judicially enforceable international custom. Judge Nervo also
indicated that racial discrimination as a matter of official government policy
is violative of a norm or rule or standard of the international community,22'
the source of which is the Charter222 and resolutions22 of the United Na-
tions.
These views have been criticized, however, as ignoring the plain mean-
ing of the language of the Charter: the members pledge themselves only to
pursue the general objective of securing observance of human rights and do
not vest the United Nations with the power to concern itself with particular
215. S.W.A. CASES II 289, 290 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion).
216. Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court.
217. S.W.A. CASES II 292 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion). Recognition was given
to the fact that there did exist conventions establishing such a norm, as did the Genocide
Convention, but these bound only the signatories. Id. at 287. However the Charter of the
United Nations was considered such a convention, binding the Respondent thereto. Id.
at 287, 289.
218. Id. at 292.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 293.
221. S.W.A. CASES II 464 (Padilla Nervo, dissenting opinion).
222. Id. at 468.
223. Id. at 470.
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infringements of human rights.224 This criticism finds support in that the
Charter provides not for the protection of human rights, but only for their
promotion.2
Nowhere in the entire Charter is to be found an unequivocal indication
of the intention to ensure human rights by compulsory protection. Indeed,
the very organs which are entrusted with the promotion of these rights, the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, are, by the terms
of the Charter, deprived of executive and legislative powers. The Security
Council alone is endowed with such executive and legislative powers; yet it
is vested only with the authority to initiate action when a violation of hu-
man rights constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 2 Thus,
the Charter is not a basis for enforcement of human rights, because it creates
no internationally enforceable rights. 27
The Charter neither defines the human rights and fundamental freedoms
which the members are bound to observe, nor contains an enumeration of
guiding principles.2 However, this is not to say that the Charter does not
lay down binding obligations which form the cornerstone of any system of
human rights to be implemented by political means within the United
Nations.
229
Much has been done by way of such implementation of the human rights
provisions of the Charter, ranging from decisions and recommendations of
a preparatory, procedural or co-ordinating character to declarations and
recommendations dealing individually with allegations regarding violations
224. This view is reflected in the words of Clark M. Eickelberger, the General Sec-
retary of the American Association for the United Nations, when he wrote:
Primarily, the protection of human rights, except in the trusteeship areas, is a mat-
ter for the good faith of the nations, the development of public opinion and the
hard work of the Human Rights Commission. C. BIOKELBERGER, THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER; WHAT WAS DONE AT SAN FRANcIsco 20 (1945).
See also Borchard, Historical Background of International Protection of Human Rights,
243 ANNALS 112 (Jan. 1946).
225. One author attributes the failure of the framers to adopt such mandatory lan-
guage to the possibility that the proposal, if it had been accepted, might have been
interpreted as giving the United Nations the right to impose actively upon the members
the observation of human rights and freedoms, and that "such would raise hopes beyond
which the United Nations could successfully accomplish." J. ROBINSON, HUMAN RIOHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 36-38 (1946).
226. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
227. M. MosKOwxTz, supra note 187, at 32.
228. P. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RiOHTs 29 (1951), wherein the author
stated:
Perhaps the fact that treaty obligations are not described in detail, is no reason to
deny the binding character of such treaty provisions, but in complete absence of
any description whatsoever no obligations can be assumed.
229. Id. at 31.
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of human rights in specific states or territories."' 0 Of the many conventions,
special agencies and other international legal instruments resulting from
these recommendations,"' the two most salient have been the Genocide
Convention232 and the Declaration of Human Rights. 233
iii. Genocide Convention and the Declaraton of Human Rights.
The Genocide Convention is a treaty seeking to eradicate the ultimate
deprivation of human rights: the destruction of national, ethnic, racial or
religious groups "as such."2' The scope of the Convention extends to pub-
lic officials and rulers, as well as to private individuals. 235 All are indictable
for conspiracy, attempt, and complicity, as well as for the crime of genocide
itself,2 and the signatories are pledged to incorporate this newly recognized
international crime into domestic law.23 ' Disputes as to the interpretation,
application, or fulfillment of the Convention are required to be submitted
to the International Court of Justice,23 with the ultimate enforcement of
the Convention resting with the General Assembly and the Security Coun-
cil.239 Jurisdiction of the Court is extended to individuals, so that persons
charged with the crime of genocide may be brought before it where such
jurisdiction has been recognized by the signatories.240
230. M. MosKowiTz, supra note 187, at 23.
231. The following are exemplary of the many conventions and special agencies
promulgated and established pursuant to the recommendations made by or on behalf of
the international community: The Commission on the Status of Women; the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection Of Minorities; The
Commission on Human Rights; The Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery; The Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Forced Labour; The International Refugee Organization; The Convention for
the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others, open for signature March 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271; The Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; The Convention on
the Political Rights of Women, open for signature March 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135;
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done September 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 40; The
Convention on Nationality of Married Women, open for signature February 20, 1957,
309 U.N.T.S. 65; The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, done
September 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
232. 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
233. 3 U.N. GAOR 875 (1948).
234. On genocide, see P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENocmE (1959); Gross,
General Assembly Adopts Convention on Genocide, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 755 (1948);
LEMxiN, Axis RULE iN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79-95 (1944); Lemkin, Genocide as a Grime
Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1947).
235. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Art. IV.
236. Id. Art. III.
237. Id. Art. V.
238. Id. Art. IX.
239. Id. Art. VIII.
240. Id. Art. VI. The relatively novel concept of jurisdiction of an international
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Genocide Convention constitutes the world's first attempt to elim-
inate planned destruction of human groups.241 To date the Convention is
in force among sixty-seven nations and has been signed by six others which
have not as yet ratified it, one such nation being the United States.242
Though the Convention grows in stature as more and more nations elect
to be bound by its terms, it fails to provide any standard or norm of en-
forceable human rights other than the emphatic proscription of acts cal-
culated to bring about the destruction of any human group.242 But the
Convention does provide a very important initial step for the protection
of individual rights the violation of which constitutes a crime cognizable in
international law. Indeed, the signatories of the Convention "confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."2 4
court over individuals in times of peace was recognized by the Nuremberg Charter and
Judgment which enumerates crimes against humanity. However, the jurisdiction of the
Nuremberg Tribunal was limited to "inhumane acts in connection with the planning
or waging of aggressive war." U.N. INT'L LAW COMM'N, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT
OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL 68 (1949). Article 6 of the Charter lists the crimes as
follows:
Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Id. at 65.
This enumeration of war crimes is said to constitute an acknowledgement of fundamental
rights of man recognized by international law:
Crimes against humanity are crimes regardless of whether they were committed in
accordance with and in obedience to the national law of the accused. Such acts
were deemed to violate the sanctity of human personality to such a degree as to
make irrelevant reliance upon the law of the State which ordered them. To lay
down that crimes against humanity are punishable is, therefore, to assert the exist-
ence of rights of man grounded in a law superior to the law of the State. Thus,
upon analysis, the enactment of crimes against humanity in an international instru-
ment signifies the acknowledgement of fundamental rights of the individual recog-
nised by international law. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64
L.Q. REv. 97, 104 (1948).
See also UNITED NATIONS WAR CRrhxES COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRMEs ComMIssIox 174, 192 (1948); Brand, Crimes Against Humanity and the
Nuremberg Trials, 28 ORE. L. REv. 93, 119 (1949); Lowenthal, Harris, Woolsey & Farr,
The Nuremberg Verdict, 60 HARv. L. REv. 857, 884 (1947).
241. Comment, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L. J. 1142,
1156 (1949).
242. STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SEcRE-
TARY-GENERAL ACTS AS DEPOSITARY, at IV-4, IV-5, IV-6, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3,
Rev. 1 (1963). The other non-ratifying signatories are: Bolivia, Dominican Republic,
New Zealand, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
243. Genocide consists of any one of the following acts, committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss2/3
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights245 constitutes a normative
pronouncement of moral principles concerning the economic, social and
cultural rights of man.2" But, by its own definition, it is simply a declara-
tion of past achievements and future aspirations,1 7 giving authoritative
expression to the fact that human rights are indivisible and universal. 4 '
In that it is a synthesis of classical and social rights,249 the Declaration has
received such universal acclaim that it has gained very considerable signif-
icance."' However, it is submitted that the Declaration yet lacks the recur-
rent observance characteristic of accepted principles of customary inter-
national law, thereby leaving the concept of human rights in a position
which commands much commendation but little legal commitment on the
part of nation-states.
3. Apartheid: A Per Se Violation of the Norm?
Even Judge Tanaka was not willing to accept Applicants' inflexible
proposition that the Respondent's practice of apartheid constitutes a per se
violation of an international norm and, as a result, a violation of the terms
of the Mandate. 21 Rather, he recognized that the policy of apartheid or
separate development is not per se illegal, and concluded that:
The important question is whether there exists, from the point of
view of the requirements of justice, any necessity for establishing an
exception to the principle of equality, and the Respondent must prove
this necessity, namely the reasonableness of different treatment. 52
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
235, Art. II.
244. Id. at Art. I.
245. The Declaration was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 10, 1948. 3 U.N. GAOR 875 (1948).
246. J. ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 39 (1946).
247. DEP'T OF STATE, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (1949).
248. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 14th Sess., Comm'n on Human Rights, at 3
(E/CN.4/SR.609).
249. See Malik, International Bill of Human Rights, 5 U.N. BULL. 519, 521 (1948).
250. E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 34-54
(1964). Such a general acclaim and widespread recognition of the principles of the
Declaration has led one author to contend that the Declaration is now customary inter-
national law. Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Sig-
nificance of the European Convention, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 15 (1965).
251. S.W.A. CASES II 309 (Tanaka, dissenting opinion).
252. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
In answering the question negatively the Judge stated that discrimination
according to the criteria of "race, colour, national or tribal origin" in
establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the territory could not
be considered reasonable and just; therefore the practice of apartheid in this
respect was unreasonable and unjust.25 However, the Judge was quick to
point out that the "Court could not examine and pronounce the legality or
illegality of the policy of apartheid as a whole; it can decide that there
exist some elements in the apartheid policy which are not in conformity with
the principle of equality before the law or international standard or inter-
national norm of non-discrimination and non-separation. '214
CONCLUSION
The case of South West Africa abounds with examples of the violation of
generally recognized and accepted moral principles which decry such prac-
tices as pass laws and involuntary servitude.2 ' However, the world com-
munity remains without recourse to any effective resolution of this unfor-
tunate situation since these moral principles have not been embodied in legal
principles whereby the United Nations might exact compliance from South
Africa.
The norm of equality among men seems to be evolving into a rule of cus-
tomary international law, but the South West Africa Cases demonstrate that
it has not yet fully evolved. Yet, the spirit of brotherhood has been inspira-
tional in the promulgation of a number of treaties, several of which are
directly concerned with the rights of man.2 These treaties reflect a grow-
ing awareness among nations that there exists a certain minimum level of
treatment which each state should accord its own nationals--thus the grad-
ual evolution of a general principle of law "recognized by civilized na-
tions. 257
It remains for members of the world community to assume the initiative
in this widely neglected area of human rights. Victims of their own inaction
and dereliction, nation-states must not simply resign themselves to the
acceptance of a similar situation. Conventions must be offered to fill the
glaring gaps in international law which allow conditions such as apartheid
to develop and subsist. But until that time the International Court of Jus-
tice will remain as helpless and ineffectual as it was discovered to be in the
253. Id. at 314.
254. Id. at 315.
255. See Appendix infra.
256. See note 232 supra for treaties directly or indirectly concerned with the pro-
tection and promotion of human rights.
257. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1) (c).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss2/3
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES
instant cases. Finding itself in an embarrassing position, the Court withdrew
as gracefully as possible on a mere procedural point. Similarly, yet another
matter of procedure stands as a menacing obstacle to the resolution of like
problems on their merits-that of Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United
Nations258 which both prohibits intervention on the part of that body in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state259
and also releases members from submitting such matters to settlement under
the Charter.16
Since the Statute of the International Court of Justice is "an integral part
of the present Charter"2'' and the Court is "the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations,"2 2 Article 36 of the Statute, which provides for the
jurisdiction of the Court, may be considered as "contained in the present
Charter."2 3 Thus, it would appear that Article 2 (7) applies to the Statute
of the Court, since a decision rendered by the Court in accordance with
Article 36 of the Statute would undoubtedly constitute a "settlement under
the present Charter."2 4 If two litigants disagree on whether a dispute arises
out of a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of one of them,
then the jurisdiction of the Court is disputed, and Article 36(6) of the
Statute applies.85.
258. The appropriate section of the Charter preventing interference by the world
community into the internal matters of Member Nations reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of en-
forcement measures under Chapter VII [which chapter provides for action on the
part of the Security Council with respect to threats to the peace, breach of peace,
and acts of aggression]. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
259. This restriction upon the United Nations finds support in the traditional concept
of sovereignty wherein each sovereign nation was free to deal with its nationals as it
wished; non-intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign nations is concomitant with the
doctrine of sovereignty. See Dorsey, Chinese Recognition: Law and Policy in Perspec-
tive, 23 U. PITT. L. REv. 17, 87 (1961).
260. See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 770-92 (1950), in which
the author points out the basic inconsistencies of the working of both this article and
Article 15(8) of the Covenant from which Article 2(7) has apparently been derived.
Article 15(8) reads as follows:
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by
the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall report, and shall make no
recommendation as to its settlement. COVENANT art. 15, para. 8.
261. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
262. See id. arts. 7, 92.
263. See H. KELSEN, supra note 260, at 527.
264. Id.
265. According to this provision, a dispute as to the jurisdiction of the Court shall be
settled by the decision of the Court itself. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 6.
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When the Court is called upon to determine whether or not a matter
referred to it is within the domestic jurisdiction of a state two viewpoints are
usually urged concerning the interpretation and application of Article
2(7) .2' The first proceeds upon the assumption that Article 36(6) confers
on the Court the power to decide disputes concerning its jurisdiction, and
for this purpose the Court has to apply and interpret Article 2(7) of the
Charter. In other words, the Court has the power to bind the parties to its
determination of which matters are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of a state.
The second view reasons that since Article 2(7) does not confer upon an
organ of the United Nations the power to determine what matters are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, only the state con-
cerned is authorized to decide this question. Consequently, the Court must
decide the dispute over the jurisdiction in favor of the party which claims
that the matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. The main
proponents of this viewpoint, the United States and France, have embodied
it in their declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. 7 This inter-
pretation of Article 36 of the Statute in connection with Article 2 (7) of the
Charter means that a party to a dispute before the Court, in spite of its
declaration to recognize as "compulsory" the jurisdiction of the Court in
all legal matters, may withdraw any such dispute from the jurisdiction of
the Court by simply declaring that the dispute concerns a matter which is
essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. However, South Africa appar-
ently would be estopped from asserting this contention since in its ratifying
statement the Union reserved from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
only "disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Union of South Africa. 20 8
Thus, under present day international law, when a nation's law and legis-
lation are restricted in their application and effect to the recognized territory
of that nation, such comes within the purview of domestic concern and is
constituted an element of sovereignty, precluding interference by other na-
tions.20 9 The result of this aspect of international law is to allow a nation-
state to treat its nationals as it so desires, short of treatment which has
266. The views herein expressed have been set out by Hans Kelsen in his work on the
United Nations and its problems. H. KELSEN, supra note 260, at 528-29.
267. See Y.B. OF THE U.N. 609, 612 (1946-1947). These declarations exclude from
the jurisdiction of the Court all disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of France and the United States "as understood by the
Government of the French Republic" and "as determined by the United States of Amer-
ica" respectively.
268. Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
269. U.N. CHAPTER art. 2, para. 7.
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external repercussions or violates the so-called doctrine or humanitarian
intervention.27 However, the area of complete domestic concern is swiftly
diminishing, and it is the duty of the world community to insure the demise
of such restrictive concepts as domestic jurisdiction as it is presently inter-
preted. This would entail a reinterpretation of the present concept of do-
mestic jurisdiction, substituting in its stead a universal rule of noninterven-
tion with more objective standards than those which currently exist. Ob-
viously there is a need for a general convention in this particular area.
But, regardless of the lack of objective standards, it is submitted that
while the South African Government might have argued that whatever
policies it pursued in the Union were a matter of domestic concern, and thus
without the competence of the United Nations to supervise, the same could
hardly have been said with relation to South West Africa. As long as the
territory of South West Africa remains a matter of international concern by
virtue of the Mandate, the application of apartheid can hardly be con-
sidered a domestic question."'
APPENDIX
The following constitute examples of the apartheid laws of South Africa
generally applicable to the territory of South West Africa. They appear in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Mbanefo, at pages 487 to 489.
(a) The census classification groups the population as "Whites",
"Natives", "Coloureds" and "Asiaties". Whites are defined as
persons who in appearance obviously are, or who are generally
accepted as white persons, but excluding persons who although
in appearance are obviously white, are generally accepted as col-
oured persons. Natives are persons who in fact are, or who are
generally accepted as members of any aboriginal race or tribe of
Africa. Coloureds are all persons who are neither Whites, Natives
nor Asiatics. Applicants say that rights and burdens are allotted,
by Government policy and actions, on the basis of membership in
a racial group irrespective of individual quality or capacity.
(b) Natives are not entitled to obtain permanent residential rights or
ownership in urban areas in the Police Zone. This restriction
applies to any association, corporate or incorporate, in which a
Native has any interest and relates to rural townships as well as
urban areas.
270. Se note 166 supra.
271. However, the Court must confine itself to the effect of the application of these
laws on the treaty obligations imposed by the Mandate, viz., the obligation of the Man-
datory to promote the moral and physical well-being of the populace of South West
Africa.
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(c) Probationary leases contain conditions providing for their imme-
diate cancellation in the event of a lessee marrying a Native or
Coloured person and prohibiting any transfer of the lease to Na-
tives, Asiatics or Coloured persons.
(d) Within the area of the Police Zone, excluding the Native reserves
and the Rehoboth Gebiet, licences to prospect for minerals may
be issued only to Europeans and European-owned companies.
(e) In all mining enterprises owned by Europeans, Natives may not
occupy any of the following posts: Manager; Assistant, Sectional
or Underground Manager; Mine Overseer; Shift Boss; Ganger;
Person in charge of boilers, engines and machinery; Surveyor;
Engineer; Winding Engine Driver; Banksman or Onsetter.
(f) In the legislation in the territory relating to registration of trade
unions and settlement of individual disputes there is no provision
for the registration of Native trade unions and no provision for
conciliation of disputes in so far as a Native employee is con-
cerned. The provisions concerning labour disputes and concili-
ation do not apply to disputes among or between Native labourers
and the others. A European Inspector represents the interests of
Native employees in proceedings of conciliation boards, the mem-
bers of which can be only Europeans or Coloured persons.
(g) It is a criminal offence for a Native employee to refuse to com-
mence service under a contract of service at a stipulated time, to
absent himself from his master's premises without leave or other
lawful cause, to refuse to obey any order of his master or to leave
his master's service with intent not to return thereto. An em-
ployee charged with any of the above may on conviction be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment and on release from prison must
return to his master's service unless the contract of service has
been cancelled. If he fails to do so he may be sentenced to suc-
cessive periods of further imprisonment, provided that no servant
may be imprisoned continuously for longer than six months in all.
(h) Only Europeans may enter into contracts of apprenticeship in the
territory.
(i) Only White persons are allowed to vote at an election of members
of the Legislative Assembly. Non-Whites are excluded by law
from serving as members of the Legislative Assembly, the Execu-
tive Committee or of the South African Parliament and excluded
by practice from being appointed as administrator of the territory.
No person other than a European may vote in any municipal
council elections or qualify for election to a municipal council.
According to the Respondent these are political institutions de-
vised and intended only for the White population group. Native
affairs at local government level are handled through Native
Advisory Boards who possess no legislative or executive powers.
Membership of local government institutions for Natives is shared
equally between Natives and Whites.
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(j) An authorized officer may, whenever he has reason to believe that
any Native within an urban or a proclaimed area is an idle per-
son, without warrant, arrest that Native and cause him to be
brought before a Native Commissioner or Magistrate who shall
require the Native to give a good and satisfactory account of him-
self and if the Native fails to do so, to declare him an idle person.
If the Magistrate declares him an idle person he shall by warrant
addressed to any police officer order that such Native be removed
from the urban or proclaimed area and sent home or to a place
indicated by the Magistrate and that he be detained in custody
pending his removal.
(k) No unexempted Native may remain for more than 72 hours in an
urban area unless permission to remain has been granted them by
a designated person.
(1) An unexempted male Native over the age of 14 years is not per-
mitted to travel beyond his place of residence or employment in
the Police Zone unless he is in possession of a pass issued by an
authorized person [the Police Zone is more than 50 per cent of
the whole Territory]. The pass must be produced on demand.
(m) An adult male Native who is not exempted must obtain a pass to
leave the territory for the Republic of South Africa. This provi-
sion does not apply to White or Coloured inhabitants.
(n) Non-White persons working in urban areas in the Police Zone are
restricted to segregated areas in the cities and buses and are not
permitted to reside in what are considered to be "White" areas
save on the premises of their employers in the White residential
areas.
(o) The educational system of the territory is organized in three sepa-
rate divisions, and the educational facilities and opportunities are
made available according to whether the child is classified as
"European", "Coloured" or "Native". This is in accordance
with government policy of separte development in which the
child's ability is never taken into account. A consequence of this
system is that Native pupils are restricted to limited vocational
trained opportunities intended for members of the Native group.
Opportunity for higher education virtually does not exist for the
Native.
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